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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURANCE TYPE AND HEALTH CARE
COSTS, USE AND CHOICE OF OUTPATIENT PROVIDER

D an-Alexandru Balan, Ph.D.
W estern M ichigan University, 2002

The im pact of insurance type on health care is a very im portant topic in health
economics. This dissertation exam ines the relationship between insurance type and
health care cost, use and outpatient provider choice using the M edical Expenditure
Panel Survey data. I exam ine separately three types of services: em ergency, non
em ergency hospital care and outpatient because the effect of insurance type on use
may depend on the type of health care service provided. The insurance types analyzed
are Health M aintenance Organization (HMO), private fee-for-service em ployer
insurance, private fee-for-service non-em ployer insurance, governm ent insurance and
self insurance.
For each service, individuals paying for health care out-of-pocket had the
lowest cost and usage when com pared to people insured by the other insurance types.
They also used more hospital outpatient care than office outpatient care when
com pared to persons insured by the other insurance types. Individuals insured through
private non-em ployer insurance had higher usage and the same cost per event when
com pared to those insured through private em ployer insurance, for both em ergency
and outpatient services. There is no significant difference in usage when comparing
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government insurance and HM O insurance with private em ployer and non-em ployer
insurance. H ow ever both HM O and government insured persons had significantly
lower costs when com pared to fee-for-service insured persons.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is concerned with the relationship between health insurance
and health care cost, use and choice o f outpatient provider. These three issues are very
important topics in health econom ics given that based on them and other information
decisionmakers could select which insurance type fits best with a given policy goal
like cost reduction or increase in health quality. For example, the relationship between
health insurance and health care cost per event reveals which insurance type is more
successful in reducing costs. On the other hand the relationship between health
insurance and health care use shows us which insurance type curbs the usage of health
care services and which encourages it. Combining this information with a desired level
of use we can decide which insurance type is desirable because it reduces the cost per
event while keeping the use close to the given level, without over- or underuse. The
impact of health insurance on the choice of outpatient provider is again related to
reducing costs as individuals who use office outpatient providers face lower costs
when com pared to those who use hospital outpatient providers.
Previous studies that exam ine these issues have significant shortcomings. First
the majority of them analyze only two insurance types at a time using the same dataset
which makes the impact of the insurance types hard to assess because of possible
changes of the effects in time and across datasets. In my dissertation however I

l
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exam ine five different insurance types using the same dataset, which makes it easier to
make com parisons across insurance types. Also the m ajority o f previous studies are
concerned only with a switch from one insurance type to another while my dissertation
exam ines the effect of a switch from one mix o f insurance types to another. M ost other
studies also fail to distinguish between the potential different effects o f insurance
types on the health care cost and use of different services. In my dissertation however
I consider three different health care services, em ergency, hospital inpatient and
outpatient services, and allow for different effects o f insurance type on the cost and
use o f each. And finally the majority o f the studies are concerned either with the
im pact of insurance type on the total cost or on use. Therefore they miss the impact of
insurance type on cost per event, exam ined in this dissertation, which is an important
part o f the total cost. As a result either they cannot attribute the cost reductions
accurately if they exam ine total health care cost because they do not know if the
reductions are connected to the cost per event or use or cannot make any predictions
regarding the effect on the total cost if they exam ine only health care use.
The results reported in my dissertation show that health insurance type has an
im pact on cost and use of health care while it has no im pact on the choice of outpatient
provider. In the case of health care costs individuals paying out-of-pocket have the
lowest cost per event followed by government insured people then by Health
M aintenance Organization (HMO) insured people, while private em ployer and non
em ployer insured individuals are faced with the highest cost. In the case of use people
paying out-of-pocket exhibit the lowest use, individuals with private non-employer

2
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insurance have the highest use, while all other insurance types do not differ in their
use of health care services.
Chapter II provides a background to the problem I analyze. In Chapter III I
state the objectives of my dissertation. C hapter IV contains a description of the
datasets and variables used in the analysis. Chapters V, VI and VII report the analysis
of the im pact of health insurance on health care cost, use and choice o f outpatient
provider respectively. And finally C hapter VIII provides a brief summary of the
results and gives further directions how this study may be extended.

CH APTER II

BACKGROUND

Health insurance is one of the most analyzed and controversial topics in the
U nited States. The controversy is not about w hether to offer health insurance or not,
because few people believe that no health insurance at all would be a good thing, but
about its forms (public or private) and means o f achieving the twin goals of cost
containm ent and health protection.
Historically, health insurance was set up to lower the financial risk from a
catastrophic illness, ju st like other kinds o f insurance, and to protect the steady
incomes of health care providers. Health care providers often would have to bear the
cost for life saving services that patients could not afford. To relieve themselves from
the potential financial burden, health care providers helped establish Blue Cross Blue

3
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Shield (B C B S)1, which is the oldest health care insurance organization in the United
States. Even as late as 1966, 80% of medical expenditures were still directly financed
through patients’ out-of-pocket payments. Private and public health insurance
together covered only 20% o f medical expenditures. Health care services were paid on
a fee-for-service basis, i.e., for each service perform ed the health care provider
received a fee. However, in 1966 Congress passed legislation creating M edicare and
M edicaid and the government started to insure the old and medically indigent2. This,
com bined with an increase in private insurance led to a decrease in the share of
medical expenditures paid out-of-pocket. Therefore, as Vistnes and Zuvekas (1999)
show, by 1997 the prim ary source o f revenue for hospitalization charges was the
government (which pays for M edicare, M edicaid and Veterans A ffairs) paying over
50% of total hospital charges and the private insurance com panies paying around 37%
of the total charges while only 5% of the charges were paid entirely out-of-pocket.
Because patients (consumers of health services) in general lack the information
and expertise to determ ine the type o f health services they need, they rely on health
care providers for treatment decisions. Therefore health care providers serve also as
health care agents for their patients and decide what services to provide based on the
patients’ need and affordability. Because both private insurance and government
payments lessened the financial constraints on the patients, the cost o f health care
grew more unchecked than it did before. This increase in cost in excess o f inflation
can be seen from the fact that the share of health expenditures as a percent of GDP

1 First B lu e C ross established in 1929; first B lu e Shield established in 1939
2 H.R. 6 6 75 - ‘T he Social Security A dm endm ents o f 1 9 6 5 ’
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grew from 8.8% in 1970 to over 13.2% in 2000.3 O f course, other factors also
contributed to the rapid increase in health expenditures. On the supply side,
technological advancements over the past 20 years have made better, yet more
expensive treatments available. For example, as Cleeton, G oepfrich and W eisbrod
(1990) find in the case of prescription drugs, about 10% o f the 200 best-selling drugs
are new each year and only 25% o f the 200 top-selling drugs in 1972 remained in this
group 15 years later. On the demand side, the aging of the population resulting from
lower birth rates and longer life expectancy, and the im provem ent of the living and
health environm ents for most people, have led to a m ajor change in the population’s
disease patterns. The disease patterns shifted from a dom inance o f acute diseases,
which were relatively less costly to treat, to a dominance of chronic diseases, which
are more costly to treat, therefore increasing the overall cost o f treatment.
Nevertheless, the shift from primarily out-of-pocket paym ents by patients to
the dom inant third party payments (private or public insurance coverage) has made
expensive treatments more affordable, leading to an increase in the overall quality of
health care. Indeed, there is evidence that the utilization o f health care services
remained constant and that the rise in health care cost is m ainly attributable to the
im provem ent in the quality of these services reflected through price increases.4
Therefore, the effect of the increase in health care costs on consum er welfare is
ambiguous since the higher costs could be offset (partially or com pletely) by the
higher quality o f care consumed. Cost containment measures can actually result in

3 Data from C enters for M edicare and M edicaid Services, O ffice o f the Actuary: N ational Health
Statistics Group; h ttp ://w w w .cm s.h h s.gov/statistics/n h e/h istorical/tl.asp

5
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welfare losses for the insured and an increase in the num ber o f uninsured. For
exam ple, Newhouse (1992) assumes that the governm ent wants to reduce its costs and
caps the am ount employers can contribute tax-free to em ployee health insurance. As a
result, the cost of health insurance to employees will increase, and young healthy
workers will probably opt toward compensation in the form of cash with no health
insurance. Therefore the num ber of uninsured will rise as an effect of this policy.
Still, the rapid rise in health care costs has concerned both the government,
which paid over 50% of total medical care expenditures in 1997 and businesses that
offered health insurance plans, which lead them to exam ine different cost containment
measures. The increase in the health care costs during the last several decades can be a
result of either increased utilization or increased costs per event or both. It is very
im portant to distinguish between increased utilization and increased cost per event
since different containment measures are needed to decrease costs for each of the two.
I also have to consider the fact that both of them are correlated with the quality of
health care i.e. increased utilization is often considered a predictor o f future health
while increased cost per event can mean that better m edicines or doctors are used to
treat the patient. M ost studies done to date do not differentiate between the two and
exam ine the impact of insurance type on either overall expenditures or health care
utilization.
The effect of different types of health insurance on health care utilization is
arguably one of the most analyzed issues in health economics. It is an important topic
because it is believed that utilization can be a predictor of future health, i.e. the more

4 S ee Green, Larry A . et al (2 0 0 1 )
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you utilize the health system the better the future status of your health will be.
H owever there is also an alternative view that believes the relationship between the
use o f the health system and future health serves to encourage the wasteful use of
health resources. The basis of this view is the assumption that there are dim inishing
returns to the use of health care and therefore the more we use the health system the
less we gain from it in terms of additional future health benefits.
During the last 30 years the utilization o f health care resources remained
surprisingly unchanged as Green et al (2001) point out. They exam ine the utilization
o f medical resources for a representative sample o f 1000 individuals in 1961 and 1996
and find, for example, that 250 visited a physician’s office in 1961 and 217 visited a
physician’s office in 1996. They conclude that these numbers are rem arkably close
given the changes in the organization of health care and health insurance industry that
have taken place during these 35 years. The most notable changes were the shift from
fee-for-service to managed care insurance and also the extension of government
coverage to poor and old persons.
The majority of the studies that exam ine the im pact o f health insurance on
health care cost or use are concerned with how Health M aintenance Organizations
(HMOs) fare when com pared with private “classical” fee-for-service insurance. This is
a result o f the fact that HM Os were specifically created to contain costs when
compared with fee-for-service insurance. The Health M aintenance Organization
Assistance Act from 1973 that created the term HM O and required com panies with
more than 25 employees to offer HM O coverage to their workers if they offered any

7
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insurance at all was specifically drafted to control medical costs in the 1970s when
these costs were rising faster than the growth in the overall econom y. HM Os are
insurance com panies that usually em ploy or contract a group of medical providers in
order to keep medical fees and the ‘over’-treatment o f the patients under control. This
means that HM Os usually com bine insurance and health care into a single
organization. M ost studies done to date find that HM O expenditures are lower than
private fee-for-service insurance plan expenditures. For exam ple, W are et al (1987)
find that medical expenditures are 25% less at a HM O com pared to a fee-for-service
plan. M anning et al (1985) report that medical expenditures are reduced by 28% in the
case of a HM O versus a fee-for-service plan. Hill et al (1992) also find that M edicare
HM Os reduced medical costs by about 11% com pared to traditional M edicare.
Stapleton (1994) finds that HM Os achieved average cost savings o f 23% com pared to
traditional insurance in 1992, after controlling for differences in benefits and risk
selection. W ilson et al (1998) find that for Boston AIDS patients, total costs were
significantly lower in H M O s com pared to traditional coverage, when controlling for
patient and clinical variables. M iller and Luft (1997) review different studies
com paring the health care expenditures of HMOs to expenditures o f fee-for-service
plans and conclude that there is a consistent pattern suggesting that H M O patients
have low er expenditures for health care. However, several studies find that there is no
reduction in costs for a HM O com pared to a fee-for-service plan. Experton et al
(1996,1997) find no difference in total expenditures for frail elderly patients using an
HM O plan and those having traditional M edicare or fee-for-service coverage.

8
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N ew com er et al (1995) report inconclusive results when com paring social HMO
(government operated HM O) expenditures in four states to traditional M edicare in
1987-1988. They find that social HMOs had lower hospital expenditures but higher
nursing hom e care expenditures.
However, there are complaints about the quality of the services offered by the
HM Os because o f the em phasis on cost reduction. For exam ple, D avies et al (1986)
argue that the average person assigned to the HM O in the RAND Health Insurance
Experim ent (RHIE) was significantly less satisfied with the care he/she received
com pared to the average person assigned to the fee-for-service system. By contrast,
people who self-selected the HM O plan had an average satisfaction equal to those in
the fee-for-service system.
It appears, however, that the complaints are not related to any actual worsening
of health outcom es of individuals. Sloss et al (1987) find, using data from RHIE and
multiple health outcome measures, that there is no significant difference in health
status between individuals enrolled in HM Os and fee-for service insurance systems.
M iller and Luft (1997) review a number of articles that used various outcome
measures to determ ine if there is any difference in outcom es between HM Os and other
types o f insurance. They conclude that some studies find better health outcomes under
HM Os, while others find better health outcomes under the alternative insurance plans.
Overall, their conclusion was that there is no consistent pattern for or against HMOs.
O ther w ork done by W are et al (1987) finds that high income people
(upper two-fifths o f income distribution) who join a H M O suffer no harm to health

9
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while high risk low income people (lowest fifth of incom e distribution) who join a
HM O are worse off than if they had joined a fee for service plan. They explain this
result by the fact that poor people are less likely to get the care they need because of
barriers to access such as telephone-based appointm ent systems and greater difficulty
in arranging transportation to central locations. A nother explanation could be that
HM Os put a greater responsibility on the individual patient for follow-up visits and
low-income people are less likely to assume this responsibility.
A nother possible way to reduce the percentage o f health care expenditures paid
by insurance companies is to adopt a form of cost sharing. In this way people will pay
a percentage of health care expenditures and, supposedly, will become more cost
conscious and reduce some unnecessary use o f health care services. Lohr et al (1986)
exam ine this hypothesis in the context of RHIE and find that cost-sharing lowers the
probability o f use o f medical care across a wide spectrum o f individual conditions and
reasons for seeking care.
There is an extensive body of literature com paring the effect of HM Os and feefor-service plans on hospital and outpatient use. A m ajor goal of HM Os is to replace
expensive inpatient and outpatient hospital care with less costly office outpatient and
preventive care. Therefore I would expect to observe less hospital utilization and more
outpatient utilization in the case of HM Os as com pared to private fee-for-service
insurance plans.
One o f the earliest studies done by Slesinger, T essler and M echanic (1976)
finds that there is little difference between the preventive care use of people enrolled

10
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in HM Os and those who have fee-for service plans. Luft (1981) finds that people with
HM O plans have lower hospital utilization and higher outpatient utilization rates
com pared to people that have fee-for-service insurance plans. M anning et al (1985)
find that the utilization of hospital services in the case of a HM O in the well-known
RAND Health Insurance Experim ent (RHIE) was 40% lower than the utilization for
the fee-for-service insurance. The use of outpatient services, however, was not
significantly different between the two insurance types. In a review o f the studies to
date on this topic, M iller and Luft (1994) find that in 8 out of 11 studies examined,
HM O hospital admission rates were low er than fee for service insurance plan hospital
rates. They also find a pattern towards higher outpatient utilization rates for HMOs.
H owever a follow up review by M iller and Luft (1997) finds no conclusive evidence
that hospital utilization for people enrolled in HM Os is low er than that for people
enrolled in fee for service type insurance plans. They also fail to find any evidence of
higher outpatient utilization for HMOs. Smith (1997-98) uses a sample o f 1977
com panies and finds that H M O -insured people had a 9.7% lower rate o f physician
office visits and a 9.3% lower rate of hospital adm issions than people with fee-forservice insurance. Kikano et al (2002) try to determ ine if patients enrolled in HMOs
differ from those enrolled in fee-for-service plans in their use of ambulatory services.
They find that there were no differences in the num ber o f visits per year between the
two groups. Ortega et al (2001) find that asthmatic children insured through M edicaid
are more likely to use the em ergency room than privately insured children.

11
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From the empirical studies discussed above it can be observed that all are
concerned about the effect o f HMOs on the utilization o f hospital inpatient services
and overall outpatient services. None examine if H M O patients also differ in their
choice of outpatient services from fee-for-service patients. This is im portant because
forcing people to use office outpatient services instead o f hospital outpatient services
could bring significant cost savings for the HMOs. Therefore I will analyze this issue
in chapter V II o f m y dissertation.
One explanation for why HMO enrollees use less hospital services is that they
are a self-selected healthier population group com pared to people enrolled in other
insurance types. Blum berg (1980), using data from California, finds no empirical
evidence to support the self-selection hypothesis.
An analysis of utilization of physician services using Poisson regression done
by Cameron and Trivedi (1998) finds that persons with supplem entary private
insurance utilize physician services more than people w ithout supplem entary
insurance. They also find that income has no effect on the usage o f physician services.
Some studies also exam ine the effect of M edicaid participation on utilization.
Currie and G ruber (1996) find that M edicaid eligibility increased the probability of
physician utilization by 50 percent. H owever the American M edical Association
(1991) finds that many physicians do not treat publicly insured patients because of low
reim bursem ent cost and therefore M edicaid coverage may not be enough to increase
the utilization of medical care. Hahn (1994) examines the effect o f extending private
health insurance to people insured through M edicaid and the uninsured. H e finds that

12
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utilization will increase for the uninsured and decrease for the people insured through
M edicaid and that the magnitude of the changes depends on the type o f care analyzed.
There also appears to be a consensus in the em pirical research literature that
uninsured people are less likely to use hospital services than insured people. For
exam ple Ryu, Young and Park (2001) exam ine the effect of insurance type on the
utilization o f health services of Korean Americans. They find that uninsured Korean
Americans are less likely to use hospital services than insured K orean Americans.
Johnson and Crystal (2000) also find that uninsured people are using less health
services except when they are seriously ill. H owever in that case they were more likely
to acquire public insurance.
In this dissertation, I exam ine whether there are any differences in health care
cost, use and the choice o f outpatient provider among individuals with different types
of insurance, while controlling for the level of benefits. C urrently there are four major
ways for an individual to be insured against the cost o f health care: private insurance
offered by an em ployer (group insurance); private non-em ployer insurance (individual
buys it directly from a private insurance company); HM O s; and public insurance
(M edicare, M edicaid, other state or federal assistance). Both group insurance and
private non-em ployer insurance categories include only fee-for-service types of
insurance while the H M O category includes all HM O types of insurance offered by
em ployer, private non-em ployer insurance companies or government. There is also the
option of not having any insurance. H owever even if individuals are insured, they have
the option o f choosing from a range of deductibles, copaym ents and services covered.

13
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This means, for example, that a person covered by private non-em ployer insurance can
be paying out o f pocket for medical expenses that another private non-em ployer
insurance plan covers. The differences in deductibles, copaym ents and services
covered across plans within each type o f insurance may be greater than the differences
between the insurance types themselves. Therefore it is not meaningful to com pare the
im pact of one insurance type to another without controlling for the insurance plan
heterogeneity.
Several different approaches have been used to deal with this heterogeneity
issue. One approach is to conduct an experim ent in which individuals are offered two
identical plans with the exception of the one feature of interest. This approach was
used in the classic RHIE by M anning et al (1988), who exam ine the effect of the
am ount paid out of pocket for health services on the annual utilization of medical
resources by offering to the subjects insurance plans that differed only in terms of the
coinsurance rate. They find that the use of medical services depends on the amount
paid out o f pocket. For exam ple the per capita expenses of the insurance plan are 45%
higher for study participants who were random ized to a plan with no out o f pocket
costs than for those who were random ized to an insurance plan with a 95%
coinsurance rate (with an upper limit o f $1000 per year for out of pocket expenses).
A sim ilar approach is to exam ine real world exam ples of insurance plans that
provide the same coverage but differ by the characteristic to be analyzed. This
approach is used by Schellhom (2001) for Switzerland where the health insurance
industry is heavily regulated and offers highly homogenous insurance plans which
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differ only in the deductible paid by the insured person. He finds evidence that in
Switzerland, the demand for physician visits is not affected by the deductible paid by
the insured person. As he points out, this could be the result o f the heavy regulation
that Swiss regulators placed on insurance com panies limiting, am ong other things, the
maximum deductible that a com pany can charge.
The two approaches described above require hom ogeneity in the insurance
plans

(e.g.,

similar

service

coverage)

and

plan

participants

(e.g.,

through

randomization or a more homogeneous population) so that the difference in health
care use can be attributed reliably to the difference in out-of-pocket paym ents (which
was the insurance plan characteristic that these studies were concerned about).
However, most plans in the US differ in terms of coverage. Furtherm ore, because
consumers can choose from different plans based on their need, they also differ across
plans in their need for health care and in their health service consumption behavior.
Because of the heterogeneity in coverage and in the participant population, it is much
more difficult to study the im pact o f out-of-pocket paym ent or insurance type on the
cost and use o f health care. However, results from such a study will be more relevant
to policymakers who are interested in knowing how insurance type and out-of-pocket
payments affect the cost and use of health care across different plans and in different
populations. Therefore, the approach that will be employed in this paper is to use real
world data, but to control for the variables that cause the variance between different
insurance programs, like the am ount paid out o f pocket.
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CHAPTER III

OBJECTIVES

The objective of this dissertation is to estimate the im pact o f insurance type on
health care cost, use and choice of outpatient provider. The m ajor difference between
this analysis and other studies that exam ine the impact o f insurance type on health care
cost and use is that I will not consider the impact of the insurance type on overall cost
of health care but on the cost per event and use of different types o f health care
services consumed. The types of services that I consider in this paper are: emergency
services (i.e. em ergency room visits); hospital non-emergency services (i.e. hospital
inpatient stays); and outpatient services (i.e. hospital outpatient visits and office based
provider visits). The empirical analysis is performed separately for each service
because I expect, for example, the cost per event and use of em ergency type health
care services to be affected less by the insurance type than the cost and use of non
em ergency type health care services. In other words, I expect that the m ore urgent and
necessary the usage of a given health care service, the more its cost and use will be
unaffected by the type of health insurance.
Jackson (1999) tested this hypothesis using a sample of patients from Battle
Creek Health Services Hospital. He found that insurance type had no im pact on the
cost of em ergency services but had a significant effect on the cost of non-emergency
services. The conclusions of this study, however, cannot be generalized to the whole
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country since it was limited to only one hospital in a small com m unity in the Upper
M idwest.
O ’G rady et al (1985) find in the context o f RH IE that persons with no costsharing incurred em ergency department expenses that were 42% higher than those of
persons in the plan with a 95% coinsurance rate. H owever, because the study has no
breakdown in cost-per-event and number of em ergency services uses, I am unable to
determ ine w hether the result is due to greater cost per event expenses or due to greater
use, or both.
The third part of my dissertation is concerned with the influence o f insurance
type on outpatient provider choice. Only a few studies exam ine the impact of
insurance type on the choice between outpatient services while the majority focus
mainly on the choice between hospital inpatient and overall outpatient services.
H ow ever it is interesting to examine the influence o f insurance type on the
choice o f outpatient services because as explained above I w ould expect that HMO
insured people will use more often office outpatient providers than hospital outpatient
providers in order to reduce costs. Still I would not expect this effect to be as strong as
the one expected between inpatient hospital services and overall outpatient services
because the HM Os concentrate more on reducing hospital inpatient care than hospital
outpatient care.
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CHAPTER IV

DATA DESCRIPTION

The data used in this dissertation are taken from the M edical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS) published in 1996.5 M EPS is a national survey that collects data
on specific health services used in the U.S., how frequently they are used, the cost of
these services, and how those services are paid for. M EPS also reports data on the
cost, scope, and breadth o f health insurance held by and available to the U.S.
population.
The data are reported at both the patient and event level. Event level data are
collected each tim e an individual uses a medical service and contains information
related to that specific use; for example, who paid for the services performed, what
procedures were performed and what diagnoses were given. Therefore each record in
the event level files represents a unique medical event and includes all characteristics
associated with that event. Patient level data contain annual data aggregated from the
event level data like the number of uses of each service while also including
dem ographic and geographic characteristics. Both patient and event level datasets
have unique identifiers for each patient which can be used to match patient level data
to event level data. The cost data are reported for each health care service on an annual

5 T he M E PS data are co llected by the A gen cy for H ealthcare R esearch and Q uality (A H R Q ), form erly
called the A g en cy for Health Care P o licy and Research. M E PS is the m ost recent in a series o f medical
expenditure surveys out o f w hich the m ost known is the N ational M ed ical Expenditure Survey (N M E S)
w hich has not been updated sin ce 1987.
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basis in the patient level files and show the am ount paid per service by the different
types o f insurance plans or by the patient. M EPS releases eight specific event files:
dental, em ergency room, home health, hospital inpatient stays, office based visits,
hospital outpatient visits, other medical expenses and prescribed m edicines file. Out of
these I will use the em ergency room file for the em ergency services analysis, the
hospital inpatient stays file for the non-emergency hospital services analysis and the
office based visits and hospital outpatient visits for the outpatient services analysis.
Each file contains information about the diagnoses, am ount paid for the service and
who paid. The medical conditions were initially classified as ICD -9-CM codes.6
Because of confidentiality issues, the conditions were aggregated into clinically
meaningful categories in the released dataset. These categories were generated using
Clinical Classification Software that aggregates conditions into 260 mutually
exclusive categories, most o f which are clinically homogeneous. In order to keep the
data manageable, I further aggregate these 260 mutually exclusive condition
categories using the Clinical Classification Software into

18 broad condition

categories. These categories are described in Appendix 1 . 1 use these categories in the
analysis to control for the effect of disease type on the cost and use o f health care
services as well as on the choice of outpatient provider.
In the analysis, I include only noninstitutionalized working-age adults between
25 and 55 years of age. This subsample is more relevant for the analysis because older
people have increasing health care costs and tend to be prim arily insured by the

6 T he International C lassification o f D isea ses, N inth R evision , C linical M odification (IC D -9-C M ) is a
classification system that groups related d isease entities and procedures for the reporting o f statistical
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government through M edicare, making it hard to distinguish between the effect of age
and type o f health insurance coverage on costs, while younger individuals are usually
covered by their parents’ insurance plan. Therefore, M edicaid will be the main type of
public insurance analyzed in the sample. It is worth noting that there exists a choice
between M edicaid and private insurance. In fact, as Cutler and G ruber (1996) noted,
only 25-33 percent of people made eligible during the 1980s and early 1990s through
M edicaid extensions took up the coverage because two-thirds o f them already had
private insurance. The reluctance to switch from private insurance to M edicaid is
explained through the lim ited service available through M edicaid and the fact that few
physicians accept people with M edicaid insurance.
For the cost per event analysis I will use three different samples, one for
em ergency services, one for non-emergency hospital services and one for outpatient
services. Restricting the samples to noninstitutionalized working-age adults between
25 and 55 years of age yields sample sizes of 1381, 751 and 43898 events
respectively. After averaging the cost per event I obtain sample sizes of 1019, 597 and
6385 individuals respectively. The means and standard deviations of the variables,
weighted by the survey persons weights for each service are shown in Table 1. The
cost per event is highest in the case on non-emergency hospital services, because of
the high cost of a hospital bed, followed by the cost per event for em ergency services
and then by the cost per event for outpatient services. The insurance mix differs for
each o f the three services. The amount paid out of pocket is the lowest for hospital
inpatient services which is also the most expensive o f service types, and highest for

information. It is adapted for the U .S . by the N ational Center o f Health Statistics.
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outpatient services which is the least costly o f the services. The percentage paid by
government insurance is also very low for outpatient services while non-employer
private insurance pays the highest percentage of the cost for em ergency services. Also
the dem ographics appear to be different for each of services. Comparatively more
blacks and males use emergency services than any of the other two services.
Outpatient services are used by more educated and higher income people meaning that
they get more preventive care and potential health problem s are identified earlier.
For the health service use analysis I will use a sam ple of 6605 patients who
utilized either one of the services analyzed. The w eighted means and standard
deviations o f the variables are depicted in Table 8. I can observe that the outpatient
service is the m ost frequently used with an average use o f around seven visits per year.
The other two services are used on average less than once per year. For the outpatient
choice analysis I will use a subsample of 6385 people who used outpatient services out
of the 6605 patients that used either one o f the services analyzed. The reason for using
this subsam ple is that I cannot exam ine the choice between hospital and office
outpatient use if a person did not use outpatient services. The weighted means and
standard deviations of the variables are shown in Table 1 5 .1 can observe that 63% of
outpatient usage occurs at physicians’ offices while the rest occurs in hospital setting.
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CHAPTER V

TH E IM PACT OF INSURANCE ON TH E CO ST OF HEALTH CARE

Theoretical Expectations

There is no established theoretical model that explains the effects of all
insurance types analyzed in this dissertation on the cost per event o f any health care
service. H owever different types of insurance have been com pared regarding their
influence on total health care cost and models have been built to explain the
differences or lack thereof. Based on these models and analyses I form certain
expectations regarding the effect of some o f the insurance types on health care cost.
Self-insurance is one of the insurance types for which there is a near consensus
in the literature regarding its effects on health care costs when com pared to other
insurance types. It is expected that a person paying more from his pocket will be more
cost conscious and therefore the cost per event will be lower for a self-insured
individual than for a person with any other type of insurance, ceteris paribus. The
difference in the cost per event could also be a result of price discrimination based on
the fact that the person paying more out-of-pocket is more price elastic and is willing
to pay less for the same services than a person who is fully insured. Empirical studies
done to date have always found that higher copaym ents were associated with lower
health care costs a result that is consistent with the theoretical expectations. For
example, M anning et al (1988) find in the context o f RHIE that the per capita
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expenses of the insurance plan are 45% higher for study participants who were
random ized to a plan with no out of pocket costs than for those who were random ized
to an insurance plan with a 95% coinsurance rate (with an upper lim it of $1000 per
year for out-of-pocket expenses).
A nother insurance type widely analyzed and for which different theoretical
constructs exist is HM O insurance. M uch o f the theoretical analysis focuses on
analyzing and explaining the effect on health care costs of HM Os versus that of
private fee-for-service insurance. This is understandable given the fact that HMOs
were created specifically to try to contain costs, which were ever increasing under the
traditional fee-for-service insurance. Because o f this, by default most empirical
models assume as the null hypothesis that HM O costs should be less than fee-forservice insurance costs. The empirical evidence largely supports the theoretical
expectations as M iller and Luft (1997) find. They review different studies com paring
the health care expenditures of HM Os to expenditures o f fee-for-service plans and
conclude that there is a consistent pattern suggesting that HM O patients face lower
expenditures for health care. Therefore I expect that the cost per event for both private
em ployer and private non-em ployer insurance will be higher or at least equal
com pared to HM O insurance.
A special case is government insurance. Usually when we think about the
government, we are thinking o f big inefficiencies and indifference in allocating
taxpayers’ money, which would lead us to believe that the cost per event should be
higher for government insurance when com pared to any form of private insurance.
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H owever this is only part o f the story. The government has also enorm ous bargaining
pow er coupled with legislative power, which makes it easier for them to get
consistently lower prices for different hospital resources. Holahan (1991) for exam ple
finds that M edicaid fees per service delivered have generally been ju st half o f private
insurance fees. Therefore, the cost per event appears to be lower for M edicaid patients
than for privately insured patients, and M edicaid-insured individuals com prise the
majority of governm ent-insured individuals. H owever the inefficiencies of this
government im posed pricing structure are evident when exam ining the availability of
health care for M edicaid patients. M any hospitals and office doctors do not accept
M edicaid insured patients because of the artificially low fees and prefer to treat
privately insured patients at much higher fees. Based on the above I w ould expect the
cost per event for governm ent insured persons to be lower than the cost per event for
privately insured people.
There are almost no theoretical models that exam ine the differential im pact of
insurance type on health care cost, controlling for the health service analyzed. Jackson
(1999) makes a case that em ergency service costs should not be affected as much by
insurance type as non-em ergency service costs. He bases his argum ent on the fact that
in the case o f life-threatening events the services provided will be sim ilar while in the
case of non life-threatening events the doctor can custom ize the services based on the
patient’s insurance level. He then tests this hypothesis and finds that insurance type
had no im pact on the cost of em ergency services but had a significant effect on the
cost of non-emergency services.
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Summarizing I would expect the cost of self insured individuals to be the
lowest, followed by the cost of government insured people, then by the cost of HMO
insured people, with the cost being the highest for persons insured by either private
em ployer or private non-em ployer insurance. The differences am ong the insurance
types should be most visible in the case o f outpatient services and the least visible for
em ergency services.

Empirical Model

The analysis of the effect o f insurance type on health care costs is performed
separately for each health care service category using the relevant event level data as
well as dem ographic and geographic characteristics taken from the patient level data.
Therefore, the initial data are in the form of an unbalanced panel because a patient can
appear as many times as he had events in the analyzed service. U sing unbalanced
panel data in survey estimation can lead to incorrect variance estim ation and to
erroneous hypothesis testing results. Therefore in the analysis I will average the cost
per event over each patient obtaining a balanced panel. I use averaged event level cost
data instead o f patient level data to avoid artificially increasing the costs of the service
for the patients with m ultiple utilization of the service. Therefore the results will show
the effect of insurance type on the average cost per event and not on the cost per
patient.
For the analysis I will estimate the following regression model:

C p b i, PRIVEMPi + bi2 PRIVNONj + bi3 GO Vi + bi4 HMOj + bi5SELFi + cXi +£i
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(1)

Q is the average cost per event of the analyzed health care service for patient i;
PRIVEMPj is the percentage of the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the
private insurance offered by employer; PRIVNONj is the percentage of the total cost
incurred by the patient paid by the non-em ployer private insurance; GOVj is the
percentage o f the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the government; HMOj is
the percentage o f the total cost incurred by the patient paid by HMOs; SELF* is the
percentage o f the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the patient and Xj is a
vector o f covariates which in this case will be age, gender, race (white, black and
other), individual income, metropolitan statistical area (M SA) status, location
variables (northeast, midwest, south and west) and the num ber of diagnoses from each
broad diagnosis category to control for the type of disease. Each diagnosis category
was added only if at least one patient from the sample had such a diagnosis. Appendix
1 shows the diagnosis categories that appear in each equation. Descriptive statistics for
all weighted variables for each service are reported in Table 1.
The coefficients b,i to bis show the effect o f the different insurance types on
the cost of health care. The constant was dropped from equation (1) because the sum
of the percentages paid by insurance types always adds to 100% thereby creating
collinearity with the constant. Therefore the signs and values of these coefficients are
im possible to predict because of the confounding effect o f the missing constant.
Nevertheless, I am not interested in the absolute value of the coefficients, but whether
they are significantly different from each other. This is because I cannot increase the
percentage paid by a health insurance provider without reducing the percentage paid
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by another type o f insurance. Therefore, I also exam ine the differences between the
coefficients, which show the marginal effect on health care cost of a switch from one
health insurance type to another, and test whether these differences are significantly
different from zero. The null hypothesis that I test in this case is that the coefficients
are equal or, in other words, that the switch from one insurance type to the other has
no effect on the cost. Significance indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected and
therefore a switch from one insurance type to the other significantly influences costs.
As an exam ple one of the differences analyzed would be (bn - bj2 ) which shows the
marginal effect on the cost per event of a switch o f one percent health insurance
coverage from private non-em ployer insurance to private em ployer insurance.
The analysis is done using a survey estimation technique, which employs
individual weights for persons and a special calculation for the variance using strata
and prim ary sampling unit (PSU) information. This is necessary because o f the
complex sample design of M EPS meaning that the data was collected using both
stratification and clustering.7 Surveys use a stratified data collection m ethod if there is
a particular interest that certain groups are included, groups that would not be included
if the sample were randomly drawn because they are too small com pared to the overall
population. Therefore after identifying the groups (strata) that are crucial to include
they are usually oversampled com pared to the rest of the sample in order to obtain a
sufficiently big sample for analysis. The cluster sampling m ethod also involves
dividing the sample into groups. H owever in this case the groups are selected so as to
fully represent the diversity that exists while also minimizing costs. For example,
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clusters o f housing units (city blocks) are identified during the sam ple design process.
Then these clusters are sampled and either all households or a sample of them are
selected from each cluster. In order to reconstruct the original population from a
survey that uses clustering and stratification I need weights for each person. The
MEPS dataset contains the person weights necessary to construct estimates for
individuals in the civilian noninstitutionalized population during 1996. It also includes
variance estimation strata and variance estimation PSUs necessary to construct
estimates of variability, such as standard errors, using the Taylor series estimation
approach. U sing the person weights corrects for the problem o f sample selection bias
that could occur because each person does not have the same probability of selection
into the initial sample.
H ow ever because the analysis is performed on three different samples another
possible source o f sample selection bias arises. Each sample is created by including
only people who actually used the exam ined service while all other people are
excluded. If the characteristics of the persons who use the service are different from
the characteristics of the persons who do not use the service then I have sample
selection bias and the obtained coefficients are not accurate. F or exam ple if the
individuals who use em ergency services are significantly older than the individuals
who do not, which is a plausible assumption, then the coefficients obtained from
estimating equation (1) without correction are true only for the subsam ple of people
who use em ergency services and not for the total population of the U nited States like it
is intended. This is because the sample that I use for the analysis, which contains only

7 For a description o f com p lex data collection using stratification and clustering se e Konijn (1 9 7 3 )
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persons who used em ergency services, is not a random subsam ple of the total
population. Heckman (1979) discusses the bias that results from using nonrandomly
selected samples when estim ating em pirical relationships as "omitted variables" bias.
He proposes a simple consistent m ethod to estimate these models, which is using a
probit model for the selection equation to construct a selection bias control factor and
then ordinary least squares to estim ate the desired equation with the selected sample
while adding as a regressor the selection bias control factor.
In order to correct the problem of selection bias I will use the H eckm an twostep estimation technique outlined above where the selection equation is the same as
the estimation equation. It is worth noting that because the selection and estimation
equation are the same, the results from the Heckman two-step estimation technique are
the same as that from a Tobit model where the cost is left censored at zero. Also
because o f the structure of my empirical model the selection bias control factor, X , is
identified by a functional form and not by a structural model.
Endogeneity is another potential problem that could arise when estimating
equation (1). Endogeneity occurs if a regressor is not exogenous but is a function of
the dependent variable. For exam ple, if insurance type was a function o f actual
average cost per event then the insurance type variables w ould be endogenous. This
problem will arise in the analysis if the insurance type is a function of the expected
cost and the expected cost is correlated with the actual cost.
Previous work that exam ines the endogeneity o f the insurance type variables
yields mixed results. M anning et al (1985) compares expenditures between the
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randomized HM O population from RH IE and a self-selected group o f H M O enrollees.
They find only minor and generally insignificant differences leading them to conclude
that results from non-controlled studies may not be seriously contam inated by
insurance self-selection effects.
W elch, Frank and D iehr (1984) com pare the cost per enrollee under the Seattle
Prepaid Health Care Project where patients had a choice between an HM O-type
insurance and a fee-for-service plan. First they estimate the cost per enrollee using
OLS regression and find that expenditures were 45 to 47% higher in the fee-forservice plan than in the HM O -type plan. Next they estim ate sim ultaneously the
expenditure equation and a health plan choice equation in order to correct for omitted
variable bias due to endogenous health plan choice. They find that in this case the
expenditures were 366% higher in the fee-for-service plan com pared to the HM O-type
plan and explain this “im plausibly high “ result with the fact that the cost predictions
in the expenditure equation were not robust to changes in the specification of the
choice equation.
From the above it follows that previous papers fail to find any support for the
endogeneity of the insurance type variables. M y analysis is also based on exam ining
the average cost per event for each service. For a patient it would be very hard to
predict the average cost per event because it is influenced by m any random factors like
severity of the outbreak of the disease, type of hospital and other variables. Therefore
even if the patient chooses a certain insurance type based on expected cost per event it
is likely that the actual cost per event will not be correlated with the expected cost per
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event. B ased on these arguments I consider that no endogeneity exists in the case of
equation (1).

Results

The results of estimating the equation for em ergency services cost using the
Heckm an tw o-step estimation technique in the context o f survey data are displayed in
Table 2. The selection bias control factor X is positive and significant showing that
sample selection bias exists in the case of em ergency services. The findings indicate
that all types of insurance have a statistically significant effect on em ergency health
care costs. A m ong the other significant dem ographic variables in the case of
em ergency services, females have significantly low er costs than males, people who
live in a M SA have a significantly lower cost com pared to people who do not and
blacks have significantly higher costs com pared to whites. The first result can be
attributed to the difference in severity of diseases across genders. It appears that
females use outpatient services more often and therefore diseases are detected in
earlier stages when compared to males, which leads to a difference o f $ 86.21 in costs.
The result for the M SA can be explained by the fact that in an urban area more
competition exists among hospitals that leads to low er costs per visit. The result for
blacks supports the idea that they usually postpone highly necessary care. This leads to
costs higher by $180.48 in the event they seek care because the disease is more
advanced than it would have been in the case o f timely treatment. People with more
years o f education also have lower costs than less educated people. This is a
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consequence o f the fact that higher educated people make more inform ed decisions
regarding care and also are using preventive care m ore often. D ifferent diagnostic
variables are also significant and positive indicating that a patient with these types of
diagnostics will incur a significantly higher cost. These results suggest that individuals
are treated differently, with respect to the cost, in the case o f em ergency services.
H owever, as noted above, I am interested m oreso in the differences between
the coefficients and not in their absolute value. These differences are shown in Table
3. M ost o f the differences among the coefficients are statistically significant at
conventional levels. From Tables 2 and 3, I can classify health insurance types in
order o f their increasing effects on the costs: self, government, HM O, private
insurance offered by em ployer and private non-em ployer insurance, where the last
three types o f health insurance have roughly the same effect on costs. This means, for
exam ple, that if an individual reduces the amount o f self-paid health expenditures by
1% and increases the amount paid by private em ployer insurance by the same
percentage, then this will increase the cost of the em ergency service event for that
person by $4.53. It follows that if an individual switches 100% o f his insurance
coverage from self-insurance to private em ployer insurance then the cost per event
faced by that person will be higher by $453. If how ever the switch is made to
governm ent insurance the cost per event faced by that person increases by only $251.
If a person moves from 100% HM O insurance coverage to 100% private non
em ployer insurance coverage then the cost faced by that individual increases by $172.
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Therefore, even in the case of em ergency care services, I have a different effect
of health insurance type on costs, a result that is at odds with the initial assumption
that all people are treated equally in the case o f em ergency services. However, I still
have to exam ine the use of the services because it can happen that while there is a
difference in the health care cost, there is no difference in the use o f the sam e service.
This could happen if some insurance type provider is more cost conscious or has more
influence on the cost than another. Another interesting result is that government
insurance has the second smallest effect on health care cost, m eaning that government
cost-containm ent measures were effective, at least in the case of em ergency services.
This result was expected from theory because the governm ent has a much bigger
bargaining pow er when com pared with private insurance companies.
S elf insurance has the effect predicted by theory, meaning that when a person
pays more from his own pocket he will face low er costs per event because he is more
cost conscious. HMO, private em ployer and private non-em ployer insured people are
all faced with roughly the same costs per event, which can be a result o f the fact that
they are treated similarly by the hospitals, like the theory predicts.
The results of estimating the equation for non-em ergency hospital services
using a H eckm an two step estimation technique in the context o f survey data are
displayed in Table 4. The selection bias control factor X is positive and significant
showing that sample selection bias exists in the case of non-em ergency hospital
services. Again, all coefficients for insurance types are significantly different from
zero like in the case o f emergency services. The only significant dem ographic variable
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is location in the south meaning that people living in the south faced a higher cost for
non-emergency services compared to people in the west. This supports the idea that
the southern region of the United States has a less developed network of health care
providers than the western region leading to less com petition among providers to drive
prices down. M ost diagnoses coefficients are again positive and significant.
However, I am more interested in the differences between the coefficients
which, as noted above, show us the im pact on the costs if we switch from one type of
insurance to another. These results are reported in Table 5. There are few er significant
differences than in the case o f em ergency services. The classification of the health
insurance types-in order of their increasing effects on costs is almost the same as in the
case o f em ergency services: self, government, private non-em ployer insurance, HM O
and private insurance offered by em ployer, where the last three types o f health
insurance appear to have the same effect on costs. Therefore if an individual reduces
the amount of health expenditures paid by em ployer-offered private insurance by 1%
and increases the amount paid by either HM O or private non-em ployer insurance by
the same amount then this will have no im pact on the hospital non em ergency costs of
that individual. Again self and governm ent insured persons are facing lower costs per
event than people insured by private com panies a result that is in agreement with the
theory.
In this case a complete switch from self-insurance to private em ployer
insurance increases the cost faced by that individual by a whooping amount of
$13,904. W hen comparing we should how ever rem em ber that inpatient hospital costs
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are much higher on average than em ergency costs. Switching from self insurance to
government insurance increases the cost faced by that individual by $8,759 while the
remaining $5,145 increase in costs results from a switch from governm ent insurance to
private em ployer insurance.
Table 5 reveals that in the case of hospital non-em ergency services I have
different effects of health insurance type on costs. H ow ever there are few er significant
effects than in the case of em ergency services, a result that is different from what was
expected. This can be due to the fact that all insurance types cover the hospital bed
costs alm ost entirely and are charged roughly the same price by the hospitals.
The results of estim ating the equation for outpatient services using a Heckman
two-step estimation technique in the context of survey data are displayed in Table 6.
The selection bias control factor X is positive and significant indicating the existence
of sample selection bias in the case of outpatient services. For outpatient services, all
coefficients for insurance types are significant, except for self-insurance. The
classification of health insurance types in order o f their increasing effects on costs is
sim ilar to the other two services: self, government, HM O, private non-em ployer
insurance and private insurance offered by employer. Out o f the dem ographic
variables, age and location in the south, are both positive and significant suggesting
that the older a person the higher the average cost per outpatient event and that people
in the south tend to face a higher outpatient cost com pared to people in the west. This
result supports the idea that the southern region o f the United States has fewer
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outpatient offices per capita than any other region m eaning that there is less
competition to drive the health care prices down.
The differences between the effects of insurance types and their significance
level are given in the Table 7. In this case all differences are significant except the one
between em ployer-offered private insurance and private non-em ployer insurance and
that between H M O and private non-employer insurance. This result is what the theory
predicted because if there are different effects of health insurance types on costs they
should be m ost visible in the case of outpatient services. Self-insured people again are
facing the lowest costs per event, which is in accordance with the theory. Government
insured people are facing lower costs per event than privately insured people a result
which again means that the government used its huge bargaining pow er to force
providers to accept low er prices for resources. HM O insured people are facing lower
costs that persons insured by private fee-for-service em ployer insurance m eaning that
the cost saving effect o f HM Os is stronger in the case of outpatient services.
The im pact of a switch from one insurance type to another also changes from
service to service. By looking at Tables (3), (5) and (7) I can observe that the im pact is
the biggest for non-em ergency hospital services, followed by em ergency services and
finally by outpatient services. This results directly from the fact that costs in general
are the highest for inpatient hospital services, followed by em ergency services and
then by outpatient services, as can be seen in Table (1) which displays the average
costs for each service.
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In the case of outpatient services a com plete switch from self-insurance to
private em ployer insurance increases the cost faced by the individual by $136. This
am ount appears small but we have to rem em ber that on average the outpatient cost per
event is much lower than both emergency and hospital inpatient costs per event. A
switch from self-insurance to government insurance raises the cost faced by the
individual by $41 while the switch from government insurance to private em ployer
insurance increases the cost faced by $96. Switching from H M O to private em ployer
insurance raises the cost faced by that person by $45.

CHAPTER VI

TH E EFFEC T OF IN SU RA NCE TYPE ON TH E H EA LTH CA RE U SE

Theoretical Expectations

As in the case of health care cost, there is no unifying model that explains the
effect of insurance type on health care use. M ost theory and em pirical w ork to date
contrasts only two insurance types regarding their effect on health care use.
Self-insurance is one of the insurance types for which there are strong
expectations regarding its effect on health care use. Because self insured people are
paying for each health care event out of their own pocket they are more cost-conscious
and therefore more reluctant to use health care services than insured people. Empirical
studies to date seem to support this assumption. For exam ple, Ryu, Y oung and Park
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(2001) find that uninsured Korean Americans are less likely to use hospital services
than insured Korean Americans.
A nother insurance type that is widely analyzed is H M O insurance. The effect
of H M O insurance on usage is usually com pared with the effect of private fee-forservice insurance. The theory in this case is rather am biguous predicting either lower
or sim ilar utilization for HM O insured people when com paring to privately insured
persons. This can be explained by the fact that there are different forces at work which
influence the utilization o f services in the case of H M O insured people. HM Os were
created to contain costs and therefore may try to reduce overuse, or what they perceive
as overuse, of health care services and this should lead to a decrease in utilization of
health care services by HM O insured persons when com pared with privately insured
patients. A nother way of reducing costs for HM Os is to adopt the gatekeeper approach
where all patients have first to see their prim ary physician who decides what medical
services are needed. This, however, is cum bersom e and tim e consum ing and,
therefore, I may observe that people who are very ill self select towards fee-for-service
insurance. This leaves however the HM O insured population being healthier on
average that the fee-for-service insured population reducing again the average usage
by H M O insured persons. On the other hand fee-for-service insurance has tackled the
issue o f overuse very seriously during the last decade while screening patients more
thoroughly before enrolling them, which resulted in the opinion of some authors in
equalizing the average utilization of resources for H M O and fee-for-service insured
patients. Indeed, recent empirical evidence points to the fact that utilization patterns
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are not different for HM O and fee-for-service insured people. For exam ple in a survey
o f literature M iller and Luft (1997) find no conclusive evidence that hospital
utilization for people enrolled in HM Os is lower than that for people enrolled in fee
for service type insurance plans.
The effect of government insurance on health care use is also analyzed
extensively. The theory suggests that because governm ent fixes the prices for
reim bursem ents o f health care services at very low levels it induces physicians either
not to treat or to treat government-insured people as rarely as possible. Because many
physicians opt out from treating government insured people, those persons may need
to travel longer distances and wait at longer queues when they decide to use health
care services. Based on the above the theory suggests that governm ent insured people
will use health services less often than privately insured persons will.
The differential im pact of insurance type on health care use depending on the
health service analyzed is scarcely analyzed in the literature. Jackson (1999) theorizes
that em ergency service use should not be affected as much by insurance type as non
em ergency service use. This is due to the fact that in life threatening situations people
will get help, no m atter what the insurance level, while in the case o f non life
threatening events the patient can decide to use the health care system based on his
insurance level. The author tests this hypothesis and finds that insurance type had no
im pact on the use of em ergency services but had a significant effect on the use of non
em ergency services.
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Summarizing I would expect the use o f self insured individuals to be the
lowest, followed by the use of governm ent insured people. HM O insured individuals
will either have lower or equal use com pared to persons insured by either private
em ployer or private non-em ployer insurance. The differences am ong the insurance
types should be most visible in the case o f outpatient services and the least visible for
em ergency services.

Empirical Model

The analysis o f the effect of insurance type on health care use is performed
separately for each health care service category using the relevant patient level data.
T he data are in the form of a balanced panel because each patient can appear only
once in the data. Therefore normal regression techniques can be used to analyze the
data. Because the use of a given service, which is the dependent variable, is in the
form o f count data I will use for the analysis a Poisson regression. A Poisson
regression assumes that the data follow a Poisson distribution, which is frequently
encountered when we are counting a num ber o f events. Poisson distributions have
three special features that make least squares regression unsuitable. First the Poisson
distribution is skewed while least squares regression assumes a symmetric distribution
o f errors. Second, the Poisson distribution is non-negative while least squares
regression m ight sometimes produce predicted values that are negative. Finally, the
variance o f a Poisson distribution increases as the mean increases while least squares
regression assumes a constant variance. In contrast, the Poisson regression model is
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not disturbed by any of the above conditions. In particular, Poisson regression
implicitly uses a log transformation that adjusts for the skew ness and prevents the
model from producing negative predicted values. Poisson regression also models the
variance as a function o f the mean.
A Poisson regression assumes that a quantity called incidence rate exists which
is the rate at which events occur. In this case the incidence rate is the num ber o f uses
per year. The incidence rate can then be multiplied by the exposure to obtain the
expected num ber o f observed events. In this case the exposure is one year for each
person.
In a Poisson model the incidence rate q for the i-th observation is assum ed to
be given by:

rj=exp(P o+ P i X i,j + . . . + PkXk.i).

If Ej is the exposure then the expected number of events Q will be:

CF ri*Ei =Ej*exp(Po+ Pi X ,,i + . . . + PkXk,i)= exp( In ® ) + (30+ P i X ,., + . . . + PkXk,i)

This model is then estim ated using the Poisson regression. In my case Ej is
equal to one and therefore the equation that I will estimate is:

Ui=exp(bu PRIVEMPj + bi2 PRIVNONi + bi3 GOVi + bi4 HMOi + bi5SELFi + cXj +£j )

(2)
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Ui is the num ber o f uses o f the analyzed health care service for patient i per year;
PRIVEMPj is the percentage of the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the
private insurance offered by employer; PRIVNONj is the percentage of the total cost
incurred by the patient paid by the non-em ployer private insurance; GOVi is the
percentage of the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the government; HMOi is
the percentage o f the total cost incurred by the patient paid by HM Os; SELFj is the
percentage o f the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the patient and Xj is a
vector of covariates which in this case are age, gender, race variables (white, black and
other), individual income, M SA status, location variables (northeast, midwest, south
and west) and the num ber of diagnoses from each broad diagnosis category to control
for the type o f disease. Each diagnosis category was added only if at least one patient
from the sam ple had such a diagnosis. Appendix 1 shows the diagnosis categories that
appear in each equation. Descriptive statistics for all w eighted variables except
diagnoses are reported in Table 8. For the diagnoses variables the descriptive statistics
are the sam e as in the case of the cost analysis.
In m ost instances, researchers are interested how the incidence ratios change
when an explanatory variable changes and this analysis is done by calculating
incidence rate ratios (IRR).
F or exam ple the IRR when holding all X ’s constant except Xi is:

IRR= (exp( ln(Ej) + (30 + (3, (X,,i + 1)... + p kX kli))/ (exp( ln ffi) + P o + Pi X u
+ . . . + PkX k,0) = exp ( P i )
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Therefore IRRs are calculated by raising e to the pow er o f the coefficient. I can
easily observe from the nonlinear structure of the Poisson regression that it is very
difficult to interpret the value o f the coefficients, while the sign shows the direction of
the im pact of the explanatory variable on the incidence rate.
In this dissertation I report only the IRRs that I calculate by raising e to the
pow er o f the obtained coefficients, and not the untransformed coefficients. Standard
errors are also similarly transformed. If an IRR is significantly sm aller than one it
means that an increase in the explanatory variable will decrease the incidence rate
while an IRR greater than one means that an increase in the explanatory variable will
increase the incidence rate.
The IRRs exp(bu) to exp(bj5 ) show the effect o f the different insurance types
on the use o f health care. Because of the issue of collinearity the constant had to be
dropped from equation (2). It follows that the signs and values of exp(bn) to exp(bj5 )
are impossible to predict because o f the confounding effect of the m issing constant.
H owever I am not interested as much in the absolute value of the coefficients, but
whether they are significantly different from each other. This is because we cannot
increase the percentage paid by a health insurance provider w ithout reducing the
percentage paid by another type o f insurance. Therefore, I exam ine the differences
between the IRRs, which show the marginal effect o f a switch from one health
insurance type to another on the use o f a specific health care service, and also test
whether these differences are significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis
that I test is that the coefficients are equal or, in other words, that the switch from one
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insurance type to the other has no effect on use. The rejection o f the null hypothesis
indicates that when switching from one insurance type to the other there is a
significant effect on use.
There are two potential problem s with the Poisson regression discussed by the
literature. First the Poisson regression assumes that the conditional mean is equal to
the conditional variance. H ow ever when using real data it happens that the conditional
variance is either greater than the conditional mean in which case we have
overdispersion or sm aller than the conditional mean in which case we have
underdispersion. Another potential problem is that of zero inflation. This occurs if the
data are generated through a “dual regim e” , meaning that first there is a stage where
there is a probability that the count moves from zero to a nonzero value and then the
second stage is defined by an event count process. This “dual regim e” causes us to
have more zeros than expected in the case of a Poisson distribution. W hile I use the
Poisson regression for my analysis, I also exam ine w hether signs o f over- or
underdispersion and zero inflation are present.
The analysis is perform ed using a survey estimation technique, which employs
individual weights for persons and a special calculation for the variance using strata
and primary sampling unit (PSU) information. This is necessary because of the
complex sample design o f M EPS meaning that the data was collected using both
stratification and clustering. The data contain information about the person weights
necessary to construct estimates for individuals in the civilian noninstitutionalized
population during 1996. It also includes variance estimation strata and variance
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estimation PSUs necessary to construct estimates of variability, such as standard
eirors, using the Taylor series estimation approach. U sing the person weights corrects
for the problem of sample selection bias that could occur because each person does not
have the same probability of selection into the initial sample.

Results

Before using the Poisson regression I exam ine if signs o f over- or
underdispersion or zero-inflation exist. Table 8 reveals that the standard error is
greater than the standard mean which is a sign o f overdispersion. The percentages of
zeros from the total num ber of observations are 85.39% for em ergency services use,
91.89% for inpatient non-emergency services and 2.96% for outpatient services use
which is consistent with the existence of zero inflation for the first two services.
Therefore the results presented below have to be interpreted with caution because of
the possible existence o f these problems.
The results o f estim ating the equation for em ergency services utilization
em ploying the survey Poisson regression are displayed in Table 9. As m entioned in
the em pirical section I report the IRRs that are calculated by raising e to the power of
the coefficients and can be interpreted. The findings indicate that all types o f insurance
except non-em ployer private insurance have a statistically significant effect on
em ergency health care use. All diagnosis variables are significant and have an
incidence rate ratio greater than one meaning that if a person has any type of diagnosis
he will use the em ergency room more than a person who does not have that diagnosis.
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Blacks are also more likely to use the em ergency room than whites having an
incidence ratio of 1.384. Therefore a black person is 1.384 times more likely to use the
em ergency service than a white person. This relates to the result obtained for the cost
per event where blacks had higher costs per event when com pared to whites.
Com bined it means that blacks are using the em ergency room more often and are
facing a higher cost per each event than whites. This could be explained by the fact
that blacks tend to be more reluctant to use the health care system and as a result they
delay the visit to a doctor in the case of a disease until it becom es acute and leads to an
increased use of the emergency room and a higher cost per event due to more severe
symptoms. The coefficient for age is significant and below one m eaning that younger
people are more likely to use the em ergency service than older people. This is a
puzzling outcom e which can result from the fact that elderly persons are using the
health care system more often for control and preventive care which leads to an early
detection o f possible problems when com pared to younger persons. All location
variables as well the M SA variable are insignificant. G ender also affects significantly
the use o f the em ergency services such that women have a lower incidence o f usage of
the em ergency room. Combining this finding with the result from the cost per event
section it follows that women are using the em ergency system less often and are also
facing a low er cost per event when they use it. This could be explained by the fact that
women use outpatient services more often and therefore diseases are detected earlier
when it is possible to treat them in outpatient care, or if they are treated in the
em ergency room they are less costly to treat because o f the early stage.
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In order to exam ine the influence of a switch from one insurance type to
another I have to look at the difference between the coefficients. As in the case of the
coefficients of the Poisson regression the differences are not directly interpretable and
have to be transformed in order to obtain the IRRs. The IRRs are shown in Table 10.
All IRRs which compare self insurance with any other type o f insurance are
significant and show that as an individual switches from self insurance towards any
kind o f other insurance the frequency o f using the em ergency room increases. For
exam ple a switch of one percent insurance coverage from self insurance to private
em ployer insurance increases the probability o f use o f em ergency services by 1.1%. If
the switch is made tow ard private non-em ployer insurance the increase in the
probability of use is 1.3%, and is therefore higher. This result is consistent with the
theory, which predicts that if a person pays more from his pocket then he will be more
concerned with the cost and use the health care system less often.
The other result that can be observed is that switching from any type of
insurance towards private non em ployer insurance leads to an increased use of
em ergency room services. For example, a switching of 1% insurance coverage from
government insurance or HM O insurance to private non em ployer insurance increases
the probability o f use of em ergency services by 0.3%. Ope plausible interpretation of
this result stems from the fact that non em ployer private insurance is usually
supplemental insurance and, therefore, people purchase this type o f insurance only if
they have a reasonable expectation that they will use it. Shmueli (2001) for exam ple
finds that sicker individuals are more likely to apply for acute care supplemental
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insurance. However, he also finds that they are more likely to be rejected by insurance
companies.
There is no significant difference in usage when we switch among HMO,
governm ent insurance and private em ployer insurance. This result is different from the
predictions o f the theory that government and H M O insured individuals will have
lower usage than privately insured people. H owever this is not unexpected given that
the effect o f insurance type on both the cost and usage o f em ergency services is
predicted by theory to be very small if not negligible because individuals in a lifethreatening situation will use the em ergency room no m atter w hat the cost is.
Therefore in the case of em ergency services I observe that the classification of
the effects o f the insurance type on usage is different than in the case of the cost.
Usage is the low est for self insurance as is the case for the cost how ever there is no
difference in usage among HMOs, private em ployer insurance and government
insurance. Usage is higher for people insured through private non-em ployer insurance
a result which is different from the case of the health care costs when the cost was
insignificantly different between people covered by private em ployer and private non
em ployer insurance.
The results of the survey Poisson regression for the case o f non-emergency
hospital services are displayed in Table 11. The IRRs for all insurance types are
significant. The IRR for the MSA variable is significant indicating that people living
in an M SA have a higher usage of non-emergency hospital services than people who
are not living in an M SA. A plausible explanation for this result could be that
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individuals in a M SA are usually located closer to a hospital with inpatient service,
which makes it more convenient for them to use it. W om en are more likely than men
to use inpatient hospital services, probably because they are m ore health conscious.
People living in the south are also more likely to use non-em ergency hospital services
com pared to people who live in the west. This could be explained by lifestyle
differences between the two areas, which suggest that people in the western region put
more value on their time, which leads them to reject hospitalizations. M ost diagnoses
variables are significant and greater than one m eaning that I have a higher usage of
non-em ergency services in the case of these diagnoses.
H ow ever our main focus is on the differences between the coefficients for the
insurance types and not their absolute values. Because as already noted the
coefficients are not directly interpretable I report the IRRs for the differences in Table
12. As in the case of em ergency services, when people switch from self insurance to
any other type of insurance they increase their usage o f non-em ergency hospital
services a result consistent with the theory. For exam ple, a switch o f 1% coverage
from self insurance towards private em ployer insurance increases the probability of
use o f non-em ergency hospital services by 2.7% while a switch towards government
insurance increases the probability of use by 2.4%. H ow ever no other differences are
significant m eaning that as people switch among HM O, government, private em ployer
and private non-employer insurance their usage does not change significantly. This
result is different from the findings in the case o f the costs where government
insurance cost per event was significantly lower than HM O, private em ployer and
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private non-em ployer insurance cost per event. Again the results suggest that HMO
insured people are no worse off regarding use o f non-em ergency hospital services than
fee-for-service insured persons.
The results of estim ating equation (2) using a survey Poisson regression for
outpatient service use are given in Table 13. The IRRs for all insurance types are
significant except for self-insurance. The IRRs for most diagnoses are significant and
greater than one indicating that if a person has that diagnosis he will use the outpatient
services more often. Age is also significant and greater than one m eaning that as
people get older they tend to use outpatient services more often. The gender variable is
again significant showing that women are more likely to use outpatient services. This
result strengthens the case made for the em ergency services result. W om en are more
likely to use outpatient services then men who in turn are m ore likely to use
em ergency services. Therefore diseases are detected earlier for women, which leads to
a low er incidence of em ergency room usage and lower cost per use of the em ergency
room. Both race variables are significant and less than one showing that blacks and
other races are less likely to use outpatient services than whites. This again strengthens
the point made in the case of em ergency services for blacks. Because blacks use
preventive outpatient services less often than whites they are more likely to use
em ergency services for some affliction that has gone untreated for a while and as a
consequence is usually m ore costly to treat.
As in the previous cases I am more interested in the differences between the
coefficients that are depicted in Table 14 than in their absolute values. As for the other
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two services, I transform ed the difference between two coefficients into IRRs because
they are easier to interpret. I can observe that switching from self-insurance to any
other type o f insurance results in a higher usage of outpatient services. This result is in
accordance with the theory that predicts a low er usage by self-insured people
com pared to insured people. A switch of 1% coverage from self-insurance towards
private em ployer insurance increases the probability o f use by 0.3% while a switch
towards H M O insurance increases the probability by 0.2%. In this case a switch from
HM O to private non-em ployer insurance results in an increase in the probability of use
of outpatient services by 0.2%. Switching from private em ployer insurance to private
non-em ployer insurance also increases the usage of outpatient services by 0.2%. These
results could be expected because private non-em ployer insurance is usually
supplem ental insurance bought to protect against expected future health system use.
These findings suggest that fewer of the differences between the effects of
insurance types are significant when looking at the use o f services com pared to the
case o f cost per event of services. Specifically, the difference between HM O and
private em ployer insurance is not significant for any service when exam ining its
im pact on the use of different health services. This means that if a person switches
from H M O to private em ployer insurance the usage o f any service will not change.
This result com bined with the findings that the cost per event is increased when a
person switches from an HM O to private em ployer insurance in the case of outpatient
services means that HM Os are successful in reducing the cost o f outpatient services
w ithout reducing usage. Government insurance also exhibits a different influence on
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usage then it did on cost. The differences between the effect of governm ent insurance
and private em ployer insurance are not significant for any service in the case o f use
while they are significant for every service in the case of the cost. Therefore it appears
that governm ent insurance is succeeding in reducing the cost without reducing the use
o f the service. H owever I have to keep in mind that this reduction in cost may be
obtained by imposing certain reim bursement levels that can induce a majority of
physicians and hospitals to refuse accepting patients with governm ent insurance. The
findings for the cost for both HM O and government insurance are as expected because
both types of insurance have focused on reducing costs during the last years. However
the results for usage shows that in general the reduction in costs is not associated with
reduced usage a problem, which is hotly debated in the HM O literature.
A switch from private non-em ployer insurance to private em ployer insurance
also has a different effect on use as com pared to the effect on cost. In the case of costs,
the difference between the two effects for all costs was insignificant suggesting that
switching from one insurance type to the other does not influence the am ount paid by
the person. H owever in the case of use two differences are significant indicating that
when switching from private em ployer insurance to private non-em ployer insurance
the use o f the respective health care services will increase. This can stem from the fact
that private non-em ployer insurance is usually supplemental insurance purchased only
when an increased usage is expected.
A nother result observed in the case of the usage o f services is that blacks are
using em ergency services more often and outpatient services less often than whites.
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This fact is observed throughout the literature, suggesting that blacks use less
prophylactic services and therefore are forced to use more em ergency services. The
same pattern holds for males who use outpatient and hospital non-em ergency services
less often and therefore need to use em ergency services more frequently.

CHAPTER V n

TH E IM PACT OF IN SU RA N CE TY PE ON TH E CHOICE O F O U TPA TIEN T
HEA LTH PROVIDER

Theoretical Expectations

There is no established theoretical model that explains the effects o f all
insurance types analyzed in this dissertation on the choice between hospital and office
outpatient care. H owever there are different expectations regarding the influence of
the insurance types on the choice between hospital and office outpatient care.
One o f the strongest expectations is related to self-insurance. I anticipate that a
person who pays more from his own pocket will more likely use the hospital
outpatient services than the office outpatient services. There are many reasons for this
expectation. One reason is that hospital outpatient services can usually be obtained
faster than office outpatient services. For exam ple if somebody has a cold then that
person will more likely go to a hospital than to an office based physician because the
form er would require setting up an appointment while the latter would not. Also
hospitals are usually more renow ned and easier to find in the case o f em ergencies than
offices especially for people without insurance who do not have a regular physician.
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A nother reason for the above m entioned expectation is based on the cost containment
procedures put in place by the majority o f insurers. In order to convince people to
move from more costly but more convenient hospital outpatient services to less costly
office outpatient services the insurance com panies instituted policies such that they
cover less o f the cost in the case o f hospital outpatient services than in the case of
office outpatient services. Therefore people with the same insurance will face a larger
copaym ent if they choose hospital outpatient services instead o f office outpatient
services. Also m any plans restrict individuals from using doctors within an office or
outpatient clinic while a self-insured individual can use w hatever health provider he
feels is better.
A nother expectation regarding its impact on the choice between office and
hospital outpatient care is related to HM O insurance. The HM Os were specifically
created to reduce the cost o f health care without reducing the quality. O ne of the ways
envisioned to reduce costs was to encourage people to switch from the more expensive
hospital outpatient care to less expensive office outpatient care. The difference in costs
between hospital and office outpatient care can be very high as Flem ing and Jones
(1983), M cD evitt and D utton (1989) and Stuart et al. (1990) have argued. Flem ing and
Jones (1983) found that the costs per visit in hospital outpatient departments and
em ergency room s were twice as high as in an office outpatient setting. M cD evitt and
Dutton (1989) reported that expenditures for the same type o f episode o f care for
A FD C8 adults and children were 10 to 107 percent higher in a hospital setting. Stuart

8 A FD C = A id to F am ilies with D ependent Children
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et al (1990) also found cost differences between hospital outpatient departm ent rooms
and outpatient office physicians exceeding 50 percent.
As a result HMOs are much more strict regarding the use o f hospital outpatient
services than the other types of insurance and especially private em ployer insurance.
In fact many HMOs do not cover hospital outpatient care if an HM O appointed
physician did not refer the patient to the hospital. Therefore I expect people insured by
HM Os to use office outpatient care more often than fee-for-service type private
em ployer insurance and the other types of insurance.
There is no expectation regarding the effect o f private em ployer insurance,
private non-em ployer insurance and government insurance on the choice between the
two types o f outpatient services. As discussed above m ost o f them have at least
im plem ented some method to induce people to use office outpatient care more often
than hospital outpatient care and therefore there is no expectation that the impact
would be different among them.
Summarizing I would expect self insured individuals to use more hospital
outpatient services while HM O insured people will use more office outpatient
services. There is no theoretical expectation for the choice o f outpatient services of
governm ent insured persons or private em ployer and private non-em ployer insured
people. The differences among the insurance types should be most visible in the case
of outpatient services and the least visible for em ergency services.
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Empirical Model

In order to exam ine the effect of health insurance on the patient’s choice
between hospital outpatient care and office outpatient care, I must first determ ine what
dependent variable to use. This is an im portant issue especially because few people
make use o f only one type of outpatient care while m ost people use both of them in
some proportion. From the selected sample I have calculated the annual numbers of
both hospital outpatient use and office outpatient use. U sing these data I com puted for
each person the ratio of office outpatient use to the total use of outpatient services
(sum o f hospital and office outpatient use), the variable that I use as a dependent
variable. W henever an explanatory variable affects this ratio significantly and
positively it means that an increase in the independent variable is related to an increase
in the use of office outpatient services relative to hospital outpatient services.
Because the dependent variable is a ratio I cannot use it directly in a standard
regression. First I have to transform it into a variable that is norm ally distributed. The
transformation used commonly in such a situation is a logit transformation. In order to
use the logit transformation you have to assume that the model that describes the
dependent variable y is y = -------- ---------- and is therefore bounded between 0 and 1
l + exp(-X /?)
like a ratio. After using the logit transformation I obtain In (y/(l-y))= X(3. The new
dependent variable In (y/(l-y)) is not bounded anymore and therefore the logit
transformation maps in this case the original bounded variable to the real line.
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Therefore instead of using the ratio y as a dependent variable I use In (y/(l-y)) and
exam ine the effect o f the independent variables on it using a sim ple regression model.
One problem with this transformation is that it cannot be perform ed if the ratio y is
either 0 or 1. H owever in the case of the sample used in this analysis, only three
patients have a ratio equal to 1 and had to be elim inated from the analysis. For all the
estim ated coefficients the sign and significance show the direction and significance of
the im pact of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable y. The values of the
coefficients show us the effect o f the independent variables on the log odds In (y/( 1y)). The coefficient can be easily transformed by raising e to the pow er of the
coefficient to show the effect o f the independent variable on the odds ratio y/(l-y).
The effect o f the explanatory variables on the odds ratio is very im portant and
indicates how the likelihood o f event y increases when an explanatory variable
increases by one unit while holding everything else constant. If the transformed
coefficient is insignificantly different from one then the explanatory variable has no
influence on the odds, if it is significant and greater than one then the likelihood of y
increases when the explanatory variable increases and when the value is significant
and less than zero then the likelihood o f y decreases when the explanatory variable
increases. In this dissertation I will report both the coefficients and the transformed
coefficients.
The data to be analyzed are in the form of a balanced panel because each
patient can appear only once in the data. Therefore normal survey regression
techniques can be used to analyze the data. The equation that I estim ate is:
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In (Rj/(1- Ri))=bn PRIVEMPj + bi2 PRIVNONj + bi3 GOVj + bi4 HMOj + bi5SELFi +
c X i + £i

(3 )

R, is the ratio of the num ber of office outpatient uses and the total number of
outpatient uses for patient i; PRIVEMPj is the percentage o f the total cost incurred by
the patient paid by the private insurance offered by the employer; PRIVNONj is the
percentage of the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the non-em ployer private
insurance; GOVj is the percentage of the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the
government; HMOj is the percentage o f the total cost incurred by the patient paid by
HM Os; SELF; is the percentage o f the total cost incurred by the patient paid by the
patient and Xj is a vector of covariates which include age, gender, race variables
(white, black and other), individual income, years o f education, M SA status, location
variables (northeast, midwest, south and west) and the num ber o f diagnoses from each
broad diagnosis category to control for the type of disease. Each diagnosis category
was added only if at least one patient from the sam ple had such a diagnosis. Appendix
2 shows the diagnosis categories that appear in the estim ated equation. Descriptive
statistics for all weighted variables are reported in Table 15.
The coefficients bjj to bjs show the effect o f the different insurance types on
the choice between office outpatient use and hospital outpatient use. Because of
collinearity issues the constant had to be dropped from equation (3) and therefore the
signs and values of these coefficients are im possible to predict. As in the previous
sections, I am not interested as much in the absolute value o f the coefficients, but
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whether they are significantly different from each other. This is because we cannot
increase the percentage paid by a health insurance provider w ithout reducing the
percentage paid by another type of insurance. Therefore, I also exam ine the
differences between the coefficients, which show the marginal effect on the choice
between office outpatient use and hospital outpatient use of a switch from one health
insurance type to another, and test whether these differences are significantly different
from zero. The null hypothesis that I test is that the coefficients are equal or, in other
words, that the switch from one insurance type to the other has no effect on the choice
between office and hospital outpatient use. The rejection o f the null hypothesis
indicates that when switching from one insurance type to the other there is a
significant effect on the choice between office outpatient use and hospital outpatient
use.
The analysis is done using a survey estimation technique, which employs
individual weights for persons and a special calculation for the variance using strata
and prim ary sampling unit (PSU) information. This is necessary because o f the
complex sample design of M EPS, in which the data was collected using both
stratification and clustering. The data contain information about the person weights
necessary to construct estimates for individuals in the civilian noninstitutionalized
population during 1996. It also includes variance estimation strata and variance
estimation PSUs necessary to construct estimates of variability, such as standard
errors, using the Taylor series estimation approach. Using the person weights corrects
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for the problem of sample selection bias that could occur because each person does not
have the same probability of selection into the initial sample.

Results

The results of estimating equation (3) em ploying a simple OLS survey
regression technique are displayed in Table 16. The coefficients show the effect of the
explanatory variables on the log odds while the transform ed coefficients show the
effect on the odds ratio. The findings indicate that all types o f insurance except
governm ent and private em ployer insurance have a statistically significant effect on
the choice between office and hospital outpatient use. M ost coefficients for the
diagnosis variables are significant and positive meaning that if a person has this
specific type of diagnosis he will be more likely to use office outpatient services than
hospital outpatient services. Blacks how ever are less likely to use office outpatient
services than whites as are males when com pared to females. The coefficients for age
and education are both significant and positive meaning that older and more educated
people are more likely to use office outpatient services than younger and less educated
people. An increase of one year in education for exam ple will increase the likelihood
o f using office outpatient services by a ratio o f 1.018. These results are probably
associated with the fact that whites, females and older and more educated people are
using com paratively more specialists than generalists and most specialists are located
in an office setting. All location variables as well as the M SA variable are
insignificant. Gender also affects significantly the use of em ergency services such that
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women are more likely to use office outpatient services than hospital outpatient
services when com pared to men.
H owever in order to exam ine the influence of a switch from one insurance type
to another I have to look at the difference between the coefficients. The differences
between the insurance coefficients are shown in Table 17 while the transformed
differences are shown in Table 18. All differences which com pare self insurance with
any other type o f insurance are significant and indicate that as an individual switches
from self insurance towards any kind of other insurance it is m ore likely that he will
use office outpatient services com pared to hospital outpatient services. For exam ple a
switch o f 1% insurance coverage from self-insurance to private em ployer insurance
increases the probability o f use o f office outpatient services by 0.45% . A similar
switch towards governm ent insurance increases the probability o f use of office
outpatient services for that individual by 0.41% while a switch towards HM O
insurance increases this probability by 0.33%. This result is in concordance with the
theoretical expectations. All other differences are insignificant at the 95% significance
level.
H owever the difference which shows a switch from H M O to private employer
insurance is significant at the 90% level and indicates that as people m ove from HMO
insurance to private em ployer insurance it is more likely that they will use more office
outpatient services. This result is different than expected. One explanation for this
result is that the theory was developed based on the initial plans of the HM Os to
restrict costly hospital outpatient services and to encourage office outpatient care.
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H ow ever since then all other insurance types have taken some type of measures to
induce the same behavior to patients which leads to the disappearance of differences in
the choice among the insurance types. A nother reason for this result could be that
H M O s have em ployed a gatekeeper form o f healthcare meaning that most patients
m ust go first to their primary provider, the gatekeeper, who then either refers them to
the applicable specialists or treats the patient himself. This policy leads as Flood et al
(1998) have shown to cost savings for a H M O when com pared to a fee-for-service
insurance even if the costs for each resource (like physicians and therapies) are the
same for the two types of insurance. H ow ever m ost physicians who serve as
gatekeeper are generalists in hospitals m eaning that this will increase the hospital
outpatient use especially if the gatekeeper also refers the patients to specialists in the
same hospital. This issue is exacerbated by a decline in the relative num ber of
generalists, who are usually the only doctors who serve as gatekeepers, in the United
States in the last decades. As the Council on Graduate M edical Education (1994)
reports between 1960 and 1988 the num ber of physicians in the U nited States
increased from 250,000 to 650,000 while the proportion of generalists to specialists
has changed from 50:50 in 1962 to 28:72 in 1988. W ith relatively few er generalists it
is more likely now to encounter one in a hospital setting where one is required than in
an office setting.
Summarizing I can observe that only self insurance affects the choice between
office and hospital outpatient care such that people who pay more out o f pocket are
more likely to use hospital outpatient care. This result is in concordance with the
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theoretical expectations that predict that self-insured people will use hospital
outpatient services more than office outpatient services. All four other types of
insurance, HM O, private em ployer insurance, private non-em ployer insurance and
government insurance have no influence on the choice between the two types of
outpatient services.

This result is different from the theoretical expectations that

predicted that H M O patients are more likely to use office outpatient care than hospital
outpatient care. This unexpected result can be the effect o f the cost containm ent policy
changes in the HM O since their inception especially regarding the im portance of the
gatekeeper, which is usually a hospital-based physician, versus the im portance of
increased office outpatient use.

CHAPTER VIII

SUM M ARY

For each service it appears that insurance type has an effect on the cost of
health care. The only tw o insurance types that have effects that are insignificant from
each other for each service are private em ployer insurance and private non-employer
insurance. A consistent pattern throughout each service is that self-insurance has the
smallest effect on cost com pared to the other insurance types. G overnm ent insurance
has, for each service, the second smallest im pact on cost suggesting that the
government was successful in reducing costs com pared to private insurance. HMO
insurance has the third lowest impact on health care cost for each service, but is not
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significantly different from private em ployer and non-em ployer insurance for
em ergency services and non-emergency services.
The results for the usage of services are different from the findings for the cost
per event o f services. The only sim ilarity between the two findings is that switching to
self-insurance from any other insurance is accompanied by both low er costs per event
and lower use for each service.
H owever while

private em ployer insurance

and

private

non-em ployer

insurance are not different with respect to the cost per event, people with private non
em ployer insurance tend to have higher usage of both em ergency and outpatient
services. Also government insurance and HM O tend to have low er costs per event
than private em ployer and non-em ployer insurance, while exhibiting the same usage.
This finding leads us to believe that cost containm ent measures are not necessarily
accompanied by a reduction in use and im plicitly o f future health.
The choice between office and hospital outpatient use appears to be largely
uninfluenced by the insurance type. Only self insurance affects the choice of
outpatient services such that the more a person pays out o f pocket the m ore likely it is
that he will use hospital outpatient services.
HM O insurance does not have a different im pact on the choice o f outpatient
care when com pared to private non-em ployer insurance and governm ent insurance.
W hen com paring to private em ployer insurance there is some evidence that HM O
insured people use more hospital outpatient care than office outpatient care. This result
is different from what was expected given that HMOs main goal is to reduce the
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am ount o f costly hospital outpatient care by enticing people to use more often the less
expensive office outpatient care.
In this dissertation I analyze the relationship between insurance type and health
care cost, use and outpatient provider choice. W hile this analysis shows important
differences am ong the various insurance types it cannot be used without further
exam ination for policy recommendations. The m ost im portant problem , which was
beyond the scope of this dissertation, but certainly is very im portant to policymakers is
the issue o f under- and overuse. For example, I can observe from the analysis that selfinsured individuals have the lowest cost per event and use when com pared to other
insured individuals. If I did not consider the problem o f underuse I would certainly
recom m end to policymakers to encourage people to opt for self-insurance, which
would reduce both health care cost and use. H ow ever it can be expected that selfinsured individuals do not use using the health care system as often as needed because
they are forced to pay everything out-of-pocket and therefore this recommendation
based narrow ly on the results from this dissertation would be wrong. A nother possible
recom m endation would be to encourage governm ent insurance instead o f HMO
insurance because it displays the same levels of use at low er levels of cost per event.
H ow ever this leaves out of the picture the fact that the governm ent fixes the levels of
reim bursem ent for health care services and this m ove from H M O to government
insurance w ould be most likely followed by an excess dem and of health services and
rationing through queues.
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Further research is also needed to exam ine if the relationships found are stable
by exam ining if they still hold when using MEPS data from later years. A nother way
of expanding the research w ould be to refine the definition of insurance types
especially of the HM O by subdividing the broad category in different subcategories.
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Table 1
W eighted Descriptive Statistics of Variables U sed in Equation (1)
V ariab le
Health Service Cost
In su ra n c e
v aria b les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HMO
Self
D em o g rap h ic
ch a ra c te ristic s
Age
Sex
M SA
Income
Education Years
R ace
W hite
Black
O ther
L ocatio n
NE
M idw est
South
W est
D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
D X4
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10

E m ergency
Services
396.32 (601.88)

N on-E m ergency
Services
5883.48 (7702.48)

O u tp a tie n t
Services
137.89 (273.20)

21.33 (38.27)
17.01 (34.16)
13.26 (32.46)
30.21 (43.55)
18.19(31.71)

27.88 (41.95)
8.48 (23.04)
16.91 (34.85)
38.35 (46.08)
8.38(17.41)

19.42 (34.55)
8.07 (23.36)
7.36 (23.97)
31.55 (41.62)
33.61 (36.85)

38.30 (8.68)
0.53 (0.50)
0.78 (0.41)
25182.3 (23944.4)
12.74 (2.66)

38.48 (8.23)
0.69 (0.46)
0.82 (0.39)
23400.7 (23863.1)
12.89 (3.02)

39.72 (8.52)
0 .57(0.49)
0.82 (0.38)
28980.2 (24349.1)
13.50 (2.61)

0.82 (0.38)
0.15 (0.35)
0.03 (0.17)

0.83 (0.38)
0.1 2 (0 .3 2 )
0.05 (0.23)

0.84 (0.36)
0.11 (0.31)
0.05 (0.21)

0.20 (0.40)
0.29 (0.45)
0.34 (0.47)
0.18(0.38)

0.21
0.20
0.39
0.20

0.20
0.23
0.34
0.22

0.02 (0.16)
0.01 (0.12)
0.02 (0.22)
0
0.04 (0.22)
0.11 (0.60)
0.09 (0.33)
0.15(0.44)
0.10(0.33)
0.07 (0.34)

0.01 (0.14)
0.08 (0.38)
0.03 (0.29)
0
0.10 (0.52)
0.0 4 (0 .2 2 )
0.1 3 (0 .4 3 )
0.08 (0.31)
0.11 (0.34)
0.08 (0.29)

(0.41)
(0.40)
(0.49)
(0.40)

(0.40)
(0.42)
(0.48)
(0.42)

0.12(0.75)
0.21 (3.38)
0.29 (1.47)
0.03 (0.43)
0.96 (8.93)
0.50 (2.37)
0.39 (2.19)
0.68 (2.51)
0.25 (1.32)
0.33 (2.85)
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Table 1-Continued
V ariab le
DX11
DX12
DX13
DX14
DX15
DX16
DX17
DX18

E m erg en cy
Services
0.04 (0.24)
0.01 (0.13)
0.1 0 (0 .4 1 )
0
0
0.44 (0.63)
0.06 (0.31)
0.01 (0.16)

N on-E m ergency
Services
0.32 (0.50)
0.01 (0.09)
0.09 (0.34)
0
0
0 .09(0.31)
0 .02(0.16)
0.01 (0.12)

O u tp a tie n t
Services
0.26 (1.60)
0.1 8 (1 .1 7 )
1.05(4.79)
0.01 (0.33)
0.007 (0.03)
0.75 (3.95)
0.29 (3.55)
0.11 (1.08)

Note: standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2
Estimated Coefficients for the Equation for Emergency Services Cost
V ariab le
In su ra n c e v ariab les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HM O
Self
D em o g rap h ic c h ara cteristics
Age
Sex
M SA
Incom e
Education
R ace
Black
O ther
W hite
L o catio n
NE
M idw est
South
W est
D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10
DX11
DX12
DX13
DX16
DX17
DX18

C oefficient

t-statistic

-6.007’
-5.074’
-8.030’
-6.800’
-10.537’

-3.24
-3.09
-4.15
-3.51
-4.93

-1.563
-86.210’
-102.812’
0.0001
-21.979’

-0.76
-2.17
-2.10
0.17
-2.78

180.483’
-109.587

2.75
-1.38

-

75.920
79.044
58.363
-

357.350
613.622’
588.058’
698.745’
221.408
894.841’
709.449’
1006.948’
815.122’
1105.855’
848.659’
519.039’
980.531’
856.535’
209.779

-

1.53
1.56
1.11
-

1.24
4.54
3.46
4.54
1.24
7.08
5.07
7.64
6.01
3.48
4.12
3.22
7.60
3.81
1.13
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Table 2-Continued
V ariab le

C oefficient
7.532*

t-statistic
2.75

* - significant at the 95% confidence level
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Table 3
Differences Between Insurance Types in the Case of Emergency Services

P riv em p
P riv n o n
G ov
HMO
Self

P riv em p

P riv n o n

G ov

HMO

-

-

-

-

“

“

-

“

“

-0 .9 3 3
(0 .1 9 8 )
2.023*
(0.012)
0 .7 9 3
(0.129)
4.530*
(0.000)

2.956*
(0 .003)
1.726*
(0 .033)
5.463*
(0.000)

-1 .2 3 0
(0 .0 7 6 )
2.507*
(0 .0 0 0 )

“

3.737*
(0 .000)

Note: Values shown in table are differences between the coefficient o f the column
variable and the coefficient o f the row variable. The p-values are given in parentheses
* - significant at the 95% confidence level
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Table 4
Estimated Coefficients for the Equation for Non-Emergency Services Cost
V ariab le
In su ra n c e v ariab les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HM O
Self
D em o g rap h ic c h ara cteristics
Age
Sex
M SA
Incom e
Education
R ace
Black
Other
W hite
L o catio n
NE
M idw est
South
W est
D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10
DX11
DX12
DX13
DX16
DX17
DX18

C oefficient

t-statistic

-127.522’
-152.581’
-178.975’
-143.209’
-266.560’

-4.49
-4.95
-5.81
-4.92
-6.88

16.576
1077.231
1632.420
-0.021
-294.465

0.42
1.78
1.69
-1.38
-1.94

723.576
-239.332

0.99
-0 .1 5

-

-

-665.760
167.554
1608.763’
-

12708.820’
13343.660’
4434.359
6916.259’
13148.490’
14008.110’
11433.940’
15148.250’
11652.970’
17295.120’
2471.114
10517.420’
15967.080’
9121.193
9475.588

-0.70
0.17
2.13
-

2.35
5.22
1.90
4.89
4.46
5.39
4.60
8.33
4.99
7.76
0.31
4.30
6.85
1.64
1.65
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Table 4-Continued
V ariab le

X

C oefficient
10.751’

t-statistic
2.27

* - significant at the 95% confidence level
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Table 5
Differences Between Insurance Types in the Case of
Non-Emergency Services

P riv em p
P riv n o n
Gov
HMO
Self

P riv em p

P riv n o n

-

-

-

-

-

“

“

“

"

2 5 .0 5 9
(0 .062)
51.453*
(0 .001)
1 5 .6 8 7
(0 .086)
139.038*
(0.000)

2 6 .3 9 4
(0.053)
-9 .3 7 2
(0 .384)
113.979*
(0.000)

G ov

-3 5.766*
(0 .0 0 5 )
8 7 .585*
(0 .0 0 0 )

HMO

“

123.351*
(0.000)

Note: Values shown in table are differences between the coefficient o f the column
variable and the coefficient of the row variable. The p-values are given in parentheses
* - significant at the 95% confidence level
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Table 6
Estimated Coefficients for the Equation for Outpatient Services Cost
V ariab le
In su ra n c e v ariab les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HM O
Self
D em o g rap h ic ch ara cteristics
Age
Sex
M SA
Income
Education
R ace
Black
Other
W hite
L o catio n
NE
M idwest
South
W est
D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
DX4
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10
DX11
DX12
DX13
DX14
DX15
DX16

C oefficient

t-statistic

1.685’
1.265’
0.729*
1.233’
0.321

4.19
2.93
1.97
3.19
0.89

1.495’
2.768
-8.650
0.0003
-2.554

2.97
0.29
-0.72
0.76
-0.90

-6.204
-1.966

-0.50
-0.13

-

-

-8.007
-8.402
20.642’
-

-3.298
1.157
-0.644
-0.459
-0.289’
0.756
-1.038
-3.755’
2.549
3.146
4.677’
-2.620*
-0.408
4.649
145.898’
0.072

-0.83
-0.77
2.00
-

-1.77
0.91
-0.40
-0.12
-2.38
0.96
-0.96
-5.68
1.47
1.31
2.96
-2.13
-1.21
1.08
3.48
0.16
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Table 6-Continued
V ariab le
DX17
DX18

X

C oefficient
-0.557
0.730
3.635’

t-statistic
-1.63
0.42
3.67

* - significant at the 95% confidence level
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Table 7
Differences Between Insurance Types in the Case of Outpatient Services

P riv em p
P riv n o n
G ov
HMO
S elf

P riv em p

P riv n o n

G ov

HMO

-

-

-

-

“

“

-

“

-

0 .4 2 0
(0.078)
0.956*
(0.000)
0.452*
(0 .0 0 8 )
1.364*
(0 .0 0 0 )

0.536*
(0.020)
0 .0 3 2
(0.872)
0.944*
(0.000)

-0.504*
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.408*
(0 .0 0 3 )

-

0.912*
(0.000)

Note: Values shown in table are differences between the coefficient o f the column
variable and the coefficient of the row variable. The p-values are given in parentheses
* - significant at the 95% confidence level
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Table 8
D escriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Estim ation of Equation (2)
V ariab le
U sage V ariab les
Em ergency Service Use
N on-Em ergency Use
O utpatient Service Use
In s u ra n c e v ariab les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HM O
Self
D em o g rap h ic
v ariab les
Age
Sex
M SA
Incom e
Education
R ace
W hite
Black
O ther
L o catio n
NE
M idw est
South
W est

M ean

S ta n d a rd E r r o r

0.197
0.102
6.916

0.601
0.389
13.906

19.418
8.410
7.531
31.242
33.399

34.617
23.933
24.323
41.600
36.930

39.610
0.568
0.821
28827.85
13.460

8.524
0.495
0.383
24340.08
2.618

0.841
0.112
0.047

0.366
0.315
0.212

0.200
0.235
0.343
0.222

0.400
0.424
0.475
0.416
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Table 9
Estimated Coefficients for the Equation for Emergency Services Use
V ariab le
In su ra n c e v ariab les
Privemp
Privnon
Gov
HM O
Self
D em o g rap h ic c h ara cteristics
Age
Sex
M SA
Income
Education
R ace
Black
Other
W hite
L ocation
NE
M idwest
South
W est
D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10
DX11
DX12
DX13
DX16
DX17
DX18

IR R

t-statistic

0.994’
0.997
0.993’
0.994’
0.983’

-2.10
-1.19
-2.46
-2.22
-5.19

0.990’
0.707*
0.892
0.954’

-2.38
-5.09
-1.15
-0.66
-3.22

1.384’
0.902

4.08
-0.55

1.000

-

-

1.040
0.941
1.001

0.39
-0.54
0.01

-

-

1.989’
3.525’
2.576’
2.340’
1.251*
2.138’
2.044’
2.932’
2.510’
3.146’
3.669’
1.864’
2.554’
2.641’
1.799’

4.64
6.84
10.93
4.96
7.27
4.22
6.17
8.93
10.48
9.34
6.08
10.03
11.72
7.76
4.06
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Table 10
Differences Between Insurance Types in the Case of Emergency Services

P riv em p
P riv n o n
G ov
HMO
S elf

P riv em p

P riv n o n

G ov

HMO

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

“

0.997*
(0.025)
1.001
(0.692)
1.0 0 0
(0.665)
1.011*
(0.000)

1.003*
(0.04)
1.003*
(0.003)
1.013*
(0.000)

1 .0 0 0
(0 .9 2 8 )
1.010*
(0 .0 0 0 )

-

1.010*
(0 .000)

Note: V alues shown in table are the IRRs for the differences between the coefficient
of the colum n variable and the coefficient of the row variable. The p-values are given
in parentheses
* - significantly different from one at the 95% confidence level
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Table 11
Estimated Coefficients for the Equation for Non-Emergency Services Use
V ariab le
In s u ra n c e v ariab les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HM O
Self
D em o g rap h ic c h ara cteristics
Age
Sex
M SA
Income
Education
R ace
Black
O ther
White
L ocation
NE
M idwest
South
W est
D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10
DX11
DX12
DX13
DX16
DX17
DX18

IR R

t-statistic

0.982*
0.980*
0.978*
0.981*
0.956*

-4.81
-5.72
-6.43
-5.05
-8.54

0.991
1.459*
1.785*
0.999
0.938*

-1.60
3.14
3.23
-0.14
-3.95

1.000
0.915

0.00
- 0.41

-

-

0.969
0.816
1.282*
-

1.494
2.609*
1.657*
1.898*
3.495*
3.973*
2.730*
4.293*
2.951*
4.920*
1.579
2.287’
3.948*
2.167’
2.218

-0.17
-1.16
2.00
-

0.84
11.16
2.10
8.19
5.30
13.38
3.87
7.40
4.12
10.02
0.52
3.52
5.89
2.21
0.97
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Table 12
Differences Between Insurance Types in the Case of
Non-Emergency Services

P riv em p
P riv n o n
Gov
HMO
Self

P riv em p

P riv n o n

G ov

HMO

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1 .0 0 2
(0 .3 7 2 )
1 .0 0 3
(0 .0 9 4 )
1.001
(0 .4 9 2 )
1.027*
(0 .000)

1 .0 0 2
(0.402)
0 .9 9 9
(0.668)
1.026*
(0.000)

0 .9 9 8
(0 .1 5 0 )
1.024*
(0 .0 0 0 )

“

1.026*
(0 .000)

Note: Values shown in table are the IRRs for the differences between the coefficient
of the column variable and the coefficient of the row variable. The p-values are given
in parentheses
* - significantly different from one at the 95% confidence level
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Table 13
Estimated Coefficients for the Equation for Outpatient Services Use
V ariab le
In s u ra n c e v ariab les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HM O
Self
D em o g rap h ic c h ara cteristics
Age
Sex
M SA
Incom e
Education Years
R ace
Black
O ther
W hite
L o catio n
NE
M idw est
South
W est
D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
DX4
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
D X10
DX11
D X12
DX13
D X14
DX15
DX16

IR R

t-statistic

1.005’
1.006’
1.006’
1.004’
1.002

3.07
4.11
4.15
2.73
1.13

1.011’
1.309’
0.988
0.999
1.044’

4.87
7.54
-0.18
-1.54
6.17

0.743’
0.608’

-5.53
-3.35

-

-

1.051
1.003
1.033

0.83
0.05
0.61

-

-

1.110’
1.017’
1.048’
1.008
1.016’
1.040’
1.024’
1.058’
1.055’
1.023’
1.079’
1.056’
1.032’
0.976
0.911’
1.032’

8.99
20.74
7.25
0.18
13.74
10.68
6.35
19.19
9.96
16.04
21.27
13.02
14.46
-0.22
-2.29
11.31
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Table 13-Continued
V ariab le
DX17
DX18

IR R
1.013’
1.075"

t-statistic
5.35
21.07

* - significantly different from one at the 95% confidence level
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Table 14
Differences Between Insurance Types in the Case of Outpatient Services

P riv em p
P riv n o n
G ov
HMO
S elf

P riv em p

P riv n o n

G ov

HMO

-

-

-

-

“

-

-

-

“

0.998*
(0 .023)
0 .9 9 9
(0 .301)
1.001
(0 .230)
1.003*
(0 .000)

1.001
(0 .584)
1.002*
(0 .0 0 1 )
1.005*
(0 .0 0 0 )

1 .0 0 2
(0 .0 7 9 )
1.004*
(0 .0 0 0 )

“

1.002*
(0.000)

Note: Values shown in table are the IRRs for the differences between the coefficient
o f the colum n variable and the coefficient of the row variable. The p-values are given
in parentheses
* - significantly different from one at the 95% confidence level

85

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 15
D escriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Estim ation o f Equation (3)
V ariab le
D ep en d en t v aria b le
Office provider usage (as %
of total outpatient use)
In su ra n c e v ariab les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HM O
S elf
D em o g rap h ic
v ariab les
Age
Sex
M SA
Income
Education
R ace
W hite
Black
O ther
L o catio n
NE
M idwest
South
W est
N r. O f D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
DX4
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10
DX11
DX12

M ean

S ta n d a rd E r r o r

63.70%

24.40%

19.42
8.07
7.36
31.55
33.61

34.55
23.36
23.97
41.62
36.85

39.72
0.57
0.82
28980.2
13.50

8.52
0.49
0.38
24349.1
2.61

0.84
0.11
0.05

0.36
0.31
0.21

0.20
0.23
0.34
0.22

0.40
0.42
0.48
0.42

0.12
0.21
0.29
0.03
0.96
0.50
0.39
0.68
0.25
0.33
0.26
0.18

0.75
3.38
1.47
0.43
8.93
2.37
2.19
2.51
1.32
2.85
1.60
1.17
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Table 15-Continued
V ariab le
DX13
DX14
DX15
DX16
DX17
DX18

M ean
1.05
0.01
0.007
0.75
0.29
0.11

S ta n d a rd E r r o r
4.79
0.33
0.03
3.95
3.55
1.08
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Table 16
Estimated Coefficients for Equation (3)
C oefficient

E xp(C oefficient)

t-statistic

-0.002
-0.003’
-0.002
-0.003’
-0.006’

0.998
0.997’
0.998
0.997’
0.994’

-1.21
-2.23
-1.54
-2.16
-4.65

0.010’
0.278’

1.010’
1.320’

0.000
0.000

1.000
1.000

0.018’

1.018’

4.28
9.21
0.00
-0.01
2.52

-0.231’
-0.034

0.794’
0.967

-4.13
-0.37

-

0.048
0.046
0.049

-

-

0.74
0.66
0.91

-

1.174’
1.008
1.074*
1.057
1.021’
1.059’
1.021
1.091’
1“ H

0.160’
0.008
0.071’
0.055
0.021’
0.057’
0.021
0.087’
0.084’
0.038’
0.103’
0.071’
0.050’
0.046
0.079

-

1.049
1.047
1.050

i00
00
o

V ariab le
In s u ra n c e v ariab les
Privem p
Privnon
Gov
HM O
Self
D em o g rap h ic
c h ara cteristics
Age
Sex
MSA
Income
Education
R ace
Black
O ther
W hite
L ocation
NE
M idwest
South
W est
D iagnoses
DX1
DX2
DX3
DX4
DX5
DX6
DX7
DX8
DX9
D X10
DX11
DX12
DX13
DX14
DX15

1.039’
1.108’
1.074’
1.051’
1.047
1.082

-

8.33
1.50
4.53
1.18
3.88
5.62
0.99
10.30
3.50
3.89
7.36
2.18
8.62
0.72
0.21
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Table 16-Continued
V ariab le
D X16
DX17
DX18

C oefficient
0.057’
0.027
0.107’

E xp(C oefficient)
1.059’
1.027
1.113’

t-statistic
8.30
1.68
6.67

* - significantly different from zero in the case o f the coefficients or one in the case of
the exp(coefficients) at the 95% confidence level
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Table 17
Differences Between Insurance Types, Normal Coefficients

P riv em p
P riv n o n
G ov
HMO
S elf

P riv em p

P riv n o n

G ov

HMO

-

-

-

-

0 .0 0 1 4
(0 .1386)
0 .0 0 0 4
(0 .6 6 3 3 )
0 .0 0 1 2
(0 .0597)
0.0045*
(0 .0000)

-0 .0 0 1 0
(0 .3 8 2 3 )
-0 .0 0 0 2
(0 .7 9 3 2 )
0.0031*
(0 .0 0 0 3 )

0 .0 0 0 8
(0 .3 9 2 1 )
0.0 041*
(0 .0 0 0 0 )

0.0033*
(0.0000)

Note: Values shown in table are the differences between the coefficients of the column
variable and the coefficients of the row variable. The p-values are given in parentheses
* - significant at the 95% confidence level
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Table 18
Differences Between Insurance Types, Transform ed Coefficients

P riv em p
P riv n o n
Gov
HMO
Self

P riv em p

P riv n o n

Gov

HMO

-

-

-

-

.

.

1 .0 0 0 8
(0 .3 9 2 1 )
1.0041*
(0 .0 0 0 0 )

1.0033*
(0 .0 0 0 0 )

1 .0 0 1 4
(0 .1 3 8 6 )
1 .0 0 0 4
(0 .6 6 3 3 )
1 .0 0 1 2
(0 .0 5 9 7 )
1.0045*
(0 .0 0 0 0 )

_

0 .9 9 9 0
(0 .3823)
0 .9 9 9 8
(0 .7932)
1.0031*
(0 .0003)

Note: Values shown in table are the transformed differences between the coefficients
o f the column variable and the coefficients of the row variable. The transform ation is
done by raising e to the pow er of the difference. The p-values are given in parentheses
* - significantly different from one at the 95% confidence level
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Appendix A
D iagnosis Classification and Their Use in the Analysis o f the Im pact
o f Insurance Type on the Cost and Use o f Health Services
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Diagnosis category

Code

Equation for
em ergency
services

Infectious and parasitic diseases
Neoplasms
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic
diseases and immunity disorders
Diseases o f the blood and bloodform ing organs
M ental disorders
Diseases of the nervous system and
sense organs
Diseases of the circulatory system
D iseases of the respiratory system
D iseases o f the digestive system
Diseases o f the genitourinary system
Com plications o f pregnancy,
childbirth and the puerperium
D iseases of the skin and
subcutaneous tissue
D iseases o f the musculoskeletal
system and connective tissue
Congenital anomaly
Certain conditions originating in the
perinatal period
Injury and poisoning
Symptom s, signs, and ill-defined
conditions and factors influencing
health status
Residual codes, unclassified, all E
codes

DX1
DX2
DX3

X
X
X

Equation for
non
em ergency
hospital
services
X
X
X

Equation for
outpatient
services

DX4

X
X
X
X

DX5
DX6

X
X

X
X

X
X

DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10
DX11

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

DX12

X

X

X

DX13

X

X

X

DX14
DX15

X
X

DX16
DX17

X
X

X
X

X
X

DX18

X

X

X

Note: X denotes that the dummy variable was included in the estim ated equation
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Appendix B
Diagnosis Classification and Their Use in the Analysis of the Im pact
o f Insurance Type on the Choice o f Outpatient Provider
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Diagnosis category
Infectious and parasitic diseases
N eoplasms
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic
diseases and im m unity disorders
Diseases of the blood and bloodforming organs
M ental disorders
Diseases o f the nervous system and
sense organs
Diseases of the circulatory system
Diseases of the respiratory system
D iseases o f the digestive system
Diseases o f the genitourinary system
Com plications of pregnancy,
childbirth and the puerperium
Diseases o f the skin and subcutaneous
tissue
Diseases o f the musculoskeletal
system and connective tissue
Congenital anom aly
Certain conditions originating in the
perinatal period
Injury and poisoning
Symptoms, signs, and ill-defined
conditions and factors influencing
health status
Residual codes, unclassified, all E
codes

Code
DX1
DX2
DX3

Equation (3)
X
X
X

DX4

X

DX5
DX6

X
X

DX7
DX8
DX9
DX10
DX11

X
X
X
X
X

DX12

X

DX13

X

DX14
DX15

X
X

DX16
DX17

X
X

DX18

X

Note: X denotes that the dumm y variable was included in the estim ated equation
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